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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 2a-3(h) of the Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The following issue is addressed by this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by concluding 
that the failure of Defendant's counsel to draft the Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce to conform with nine (9) particular 
and identifiable stipulations made on the record was not "good 
cause" to enter an order nunc pro tunc? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. "Determining whether the 
trial court properly utilized the legal doctrine of nunc pro tunc 
. . . presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." Matter of Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973, 977 (Utah 
App. 1993)(citing Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah 
App. 1990)). Under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l (1989), 
the trial court may enter an order nunc pro tunc upon a finding 
of good cause. The Utah Court of Appeals gives the trial court 
broad discretion in determining whether such good cause exists. 
Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987) . 
As stated in Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d at 1060, the 
appellate court "may affirm 'if the trial court's decision can be 
sustained on any proper legal basis.'" (Quoting Taylor v. Estate 
of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1989)). It is the task 
of the appellate court to "determine if the findings of the court 
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below or the undisputed evidence in the record support a decision 
not to enter a nunc pro tunc order under section 30-4a-l." 
Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d at 1060. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-4a-l: 
Authority of court. 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding 
of good cause and giving of such notice as may be 
ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter 
relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or 
annulment of marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order on Plaintiff's Second 
Motion to Set Aside Order dated and entered February 11, 1994. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered May 
2, 1988. On or about September 8, 1989, Mrs. Robinson filed a 
Petition to Modify Decree, concerning issues related to the case 
and support of the parties' three children. On or about October 
31, 1990, Mr. Lewis filed an Answer and Verified Counter Petition 
to Mrs. Robinson's Petition. On or about January 15, 1993, the 
trial court conducted a hearing on the petition and counter 
petition, at which time the parties stipulated on the record in 
open court to certain modifications of the Decree. Subsequent to 
the hearing, the parties' attorneys exchanged and critiqued 
copies of the proposed order regarding the January 15, 1993 
hearing. Mrs. Robinson's counsel requested a copy of the 
transcript of the January hearing on March 11, 1993. Mr. Lewis' 
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counsel submitted an Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce which 
was signed and entered by the trial court on March 31, 1993. On 
or about April 22, 1993, Mrs. Robinson's counsel filed an 
Objection to Proposed Order and Request for Additional Time to 
Obtain Transcript, which the trial court overruled by an order 
entered on the 11th day of February, 1994. Mrs. Robinson's 
counsel filed a motion to modify the order nunc pro tunc on or 
about April 28, 1993. The trial court denied Mrs. Robinson's 
Motion by Memorandum Decision dated September 13, 1993, which was 
never reduced to a signed order. On or about September 22, 1993, 
Mrs. Robinson's counsel made a motion for Rehearing of Motion to 
Set Aside Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc. The trial 
court entered an order on the Motion for Rehearing on February 
11, 1994, from which this appeal ensues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered 
May 2, 1988. (Decree of Divorce, May 2, 1988). 
2. The parties have three children, two of which are still 
minors. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, May 2, 1988, 
paragraph 4). 
3. On or about September 8, 1989, Mrs. Robinson filed a 
Petition to Modify Decree. (Petition to Modify Decree, dated 
September 8, 1989) . 
4. On or about October 31, 1990, Mr. Lewis filed an Answer 
to Mrs. Robinson's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, which 
included a Verified Counter Petition. (Answer to Petition to 
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Modify Decree of Divorce and Verified Counter Petition, dated 
October 31, 1990). 
5. On or about January 15, 1993, the trial court conducted 
a hearing on the petition and counter petition, at which time the 
parties stipulated on the record in open court to certain 
modifications. (Transcript, January 15, 1993). 
6. The parties7 counsel exchanged and critiqued copies of 
the proposed order regarding the January 15, 1993 hearing. 
(Affidavit of Brent D. Young, April 25, 1993, paragraphs 2-5). 
7. Mrs. Robinson's counsel requested a copy of the 
transcript of the January, 1993 hearing on March 11, 1993. 
(Request for Transcript, March 11, 1993). 
8. Mr. Lewis' counsel submitted an Order Modifying Decree 
of Divorce which was signed and entered by the trial court on 
March 31, 1993. (Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, March 31, 
1993) . 
9. On or about April 22, 1993, Mrs. Robinson's counsel 
filed an Objection to Proposed Order and Request for Additional 
Time to Obtain Transcript. (Objection to Proposed Order and 
Request for Additional Time to Obtain Transcript, April 22, 
1993) . 
10. On or about April 28, 1993, Mrs. Robinson's counsel 
made a Motion to Set Aside Order wherein counsel requested the 
Order be modified nunc pro tunc "so that the order will 
accurately reflect the stipulation which was made on the record." 
(Motion to Set Aside Order, April 28, 1993). 
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11. On or about May 3, 1993, Mrs. Robinson filed a 
Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Set Aside or Modify, 
comparing the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce to the actual 
stipulations recorded in the Transcript of the January 15, 1993 
hearing on the decree modification. (Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Set Aside Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc, May 
3, 1993) . 
12. In a Memorandum Decision dated May 19, 1993, the trial 
court overruled Mrs. Robinson's Objection to Proposed Order and 
Request for Additional Time to Obtain Transcript as untimely 
filed and for failure to set forth a justifiable ground for 
relief; the Decision was reduced to an order signed on the 11th 
day of February, 1994. (Memorandum Decision, May 19, 1993; Order 
on Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order, February 11, 1994). 
13. In a Memorandum Decision dated September 13, 1993, the 
trial court denied Mrs. Robinson's Motion to modify the order 
nunc pro tunc; the Decision was never reduced to a signed order. 
(Memorandum Decision, September 13, 1993). 
14. The trial court's basis for denying the nunc pro tunc 
modification request was that the requested changes "are more 
than just mere clerical mistakes." (Memorandum Decision, 
September 13, 1993, paragraph 2). 
15. On or about September 22, 1993, Mrs. Robinson made a 
Motion for Rehearing of Motion to Set Aside Order of Modify the 
Order Nunc Pro Tunc. (Motion for Rehearing of Motion to Set 
Aside Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc, September 22, 
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1993) . 
16. The trial court entered an Order on Plaintiff's Second 
Motion to Set Aside Order on February 11, 1994, denying Mrs. 
Robinson's Motion on the basis that "good cause" does not exist 
under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l to allow the court in 
its discretion to modify the order nunc pro tunc. (Order on 
Plaintiff's Second Motion to Set Aside Order, February 11, 1994, 
paragraph 4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court entered an Order on Plaintiff's Second 
Motion to Set Aside Order on February 11, 1994, denying Mrs. 
Robinson's Motion on the basis that "good cause" does not exist 
under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l to allow the court in 
its discretion to modify the order nunc pro tunc. (Statement of 
Facts, paragraph 16). The court quoted language from Bagshaw v. 
Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Utah App. 1990) in making the 
determination that good cause was lacking. "'The general 
principles of the common law of nunc pro tunc . . . are relevant, 
if not controlling, in a determination of good cause'" (Order on 
Plaintiff's Second Motion, page 1). 
The Bagshaw court determined that a finding of "good cause" 
depended upon the type of error from which relief is sought, 
whether the requested changes were reflected in the record, and 
whether an "obvious injustice" would result if the changes were 
not made. Id. at 1061. In our case, the requested changes are 
reflected in the actual stipulations of the parties as found in 
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the certified transcript of the January, 1993 hearing. Without 
the requested changes, an obvious injustice results. In effect, 
Mr. Lewis has been allowed to unilaterally alter the agreements 
reached at the January, 1993 hearing. Finally, the type of error 
presented fits within the common law definition of clerical 
error, and this case is factually similar to previous cases in 
which a nunc pro tunc modification was permitted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CONCLUDING 
THAT THE FAILURE OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL TO DRAFT THE 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE TO CONFORM WITH NINE 
(9) PARTICULAR AND IDENTIFIABLE STIPULATIONS MADE ON 
THE RECORD WAS NOT "GOOD CAUSE" TO ENTER AN ORDER NUNC 
PRO TUNC. 
Under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l (1989), the trial 
court may enter an order nunc pro tunc upon a finding of good 
cause. The Utah Court of Appeals gives the trial court broad 
discretion in determining whether such good cause exists. Home 
v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987) . The trial court, 
however, is not permitted an unbridled exercise of discretion. 
Some guidance is given by the case of Bacrshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 
P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990), wherein the appellate court 
recognized that section 30-4a-l "does not abrogate all the common 
law trappings of nunc pro tunc law." Id. at 1060. 
The Bagshaw court determined that a finding of "good cause" 
depended upon the type of error from which relief is sought, 
whether the requested changes were reflected in the record, and 
whether an "obvious injustice" would result if the changes were 
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not made. Id. at 1061. In order for Mrs. Robinson to establish 
that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion, she "must 
first marshall all the evidence that supports the finding and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence the finding is so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence.'" Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 
1992)(quoting Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 
1992)). The evidence of record and the "common law trappings" of 
nunc pro tunc law demonstrate together that the decision of the 
trial court was an abuse of discretion. 
A. THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD SUPPORTS A NUNC PRO TUNC MODIFICATION. 
The guiding principle of nunc pro tunc law is that "a nunc 
pro tunc order must . . . be entered for the purpose of making 
the record reflect what actually was meant to happen at a prior 
time." Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990). In 
the Bagshaw case, Mr. Bagshaw claimed that a stipulation was made 
by the parties, but never entered as an order by the court. Mr. 
Bagshaw sought an order nunc pro tunc to correct the situation. 
There, the court said that "in determining good cause in our 
case, the threshold inquiry is (1) did Husband and Wife clearly 
agree that alimony would be terminated in 1973, and (2) was the 
court prepared in 1973 to enter an order based upon that 
agreement?" Id. at 1061. 
The threshold inquiry in our case is the same. The 
transcript of the January, 1993 hearing evidences the fact that 
the parties actually stipulated to certain identifiable 
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modifications to the Decree of Divorce. The fact that the court 
signed the order presented by Mr. Lewis is evidence that the 
court was prepared to enter an order based upon the agreements 
reached at the January, 1993 hearing. One issue is whether those 
stipulations are adequately covered by the Order Modifying Decree 
of Divorce as it stands. The Order does not accurately reflect 
what took place at the January, 1993 hearing. Mrs. Robinson's 
counsel filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc (Memorandum, May 3, 
1993), and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Rehearing 
(Memorandum, September 22, 1993). In both Memoranda, Mrs. 
Robinson stated that certain identifiable paragraphs of the Order 
Modifying Decree did not reflect the stipulations made at the 
January, 1993 hearing. 
Paragraph 4.c. of the Order Modifying Decree contains extra 
language which was not agreed to in the stipulation on the record 
of the January, 1993 hearing. That paragraph states that 
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 [h]olidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and no 
changes should be made to the regular rotation of the alternating 
weekend schedule." (Emphasis added). The parties did agree that 
the holiday visitation should take precedence over the regular 
weekend visitation. The parties, however, neither discussed nor 
agreed that the regular weekend rotation would stay the same. 
The emphasized language was not stipulated to at the hearing. 
The transcript reads: 
Mr. West: We would ask for a couple [of] 
modifications on visitations on the holidays. For 
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example, if we have one on a Monday - if a holiday is 
on a long weekend, either Friday or Monday, whoever has 
that holiday should have the children for that entire 
weekend, for the three day weekend. That just makes 
sense to me instead of having one party split up a 
weekend. And that holiday should take precedence over 
regular visitation. Some years that will work out to 
my client's benefit, some years to Mr. Young's client's 
benefit. 
Mr. Young: That's agreeable. 
The Court: All right. 
(Transcript of January, 1993 hearing, page 3, lines 13-24). 
The parties agreed to allow the holiday visitation to take 
precedence over the regular weekend vitiation. The agreement did 
not state that the regular weekend schedule would be unaffected. 
Mr. Lewis could just as easily drafted paragraph 4.c. to read 
that the parties may negotiate changes in the regular weekend 
rotation. That is another possible result of the agreement 
reached. Since neither was part of the explicit agreement, 
neither should be included in the Order. The Order Modifying 
Decree should be changed nunc pro tunc to delete the emphasized 
language in order to accurately reflect the record. 
Another paragraph similarly contains language that was not 
part of the recorded stipulation. Paragraph 4.1. states: 
"[e]ach parent shall be allowed two weeks per year uninterrupted 
possession of the children for purposes of vacation, provided the 
same does not interfere with holiday visitation per above. Each 
parent shall notify the other in writing of such two week period 
at least 30 days in advance." (Emphasis added). In the 
transcript, this provision was discussed. 
Mr. Young: One of the problems we've had in the 
past -- and I'm sure because of Mr. Lewis's attitude 
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here today that he wouldn't object, but I would like to 
have it in the order --is the every other weekend 
visitation has been -- this is a long time ago. I sure 
he wouldn't do it again -- has been used to stop her 
from having any kind of extended visitation --or 
extended vacation with Cammeron and the rest of the 
family because he's had every other week. Now, to the 
extent she might want to go on a week or two week 
vacation, if she gives him notice 30 days in advance, 
she would like to do that. 
Ms. Robinson: I'll make it mutual. 
Mr. West: How about we make it each of you are 
entitled to -- mutually entitled to two weeks extended 
visitation --
Mr. Lewis: I've never tried to antagonize her 
visitation Mr. Young. 
The Court: Let's have a provision that each of 
the parties have an uninterrupted two week vacation, 
during which visitation will be suspended during that 
visitation. 
(Transcript of January, 1993 hearing, page 15, lines 12-25, page 
16, lines 1-7). 
As shown by the transcript, the parties did agree to two weeks of 
uninterrupted summer visitation. The parties also agreed to 
provide thirty days notice for the two week vacation. Mr. Lewis' 
Order adds that the two week visitation cannot take place over a 
holiday and that the thirty day notice must be in writing. Both 
terms are restrictive and neither was agreed upon or even 
discussed at the January, 1993 hearing. A nunc pro tunc 
modification is necessary to allow the two week visitation to 
take place over a holiday and to permit oral as well as written 
notice. 
Paragraph 4.k. states: l![t]he Defendant is entitled to six 
weeks summer visitation if the minor child is in a traditional 
school. If the child goes to a year round school, the Defendant 
is still entitled to six weeks extended visitation, but not to 
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interfere with the child's schooling. Defendant shall give 
Plaintiff 3 0 days." The natural reading of this paragraph 
permits Mr. Lewis to request six continuous weeks of summer 
vacation. A different result was contemplated in the record. 
Mr. West: Currently Mr. Lewis has again this year 
-- under the order he gets the children for five weeks 
during the summer, and we would ask that that be 
increased maybe one more week to six weeks, about half 
the vacation. Also, there isn't a set breakdown on 
when to take the kids. I think they've been able to 
work that out. So I don't think we need to say two 
week periods or four weeks. I think they can work that 
out. And we would ask you to agree to six weeks in the 
summer. 
Ms. Robinson: That's fine. 
The Court: Okay. 
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 7, lines 7-17) . 
According to the transcript, the parties contemplated that the 
six week visitation would be divided into two and four week 
periods. At the very least, the Order should have recognized 
that the parties would work out the arrangements of dividing the 
six week visitation. A nunc pro tunc modification will correct 
the order to reflect that arrangement that the six week 
visitation will be divided by agreement of the parties. 
Paragraph 4.s. of the Order is also in error. It states: 
fl[t]he Defendant may attend Parent-Teacher conference, but he 
shall coordinate with Plaintiff so that they go at different 
times." The parties' agreement was more explicit. 
Mr. West: As a noncustodial parent for the last 
13 years, I've never missed a parent teacher 
conference. Some have a civil enough relationship to 
go with the other parent. I don't. I go one night and 
she goes the other night. 
The Court: I don't want them there creating havoc 
at the school. I think he's entitled to know and to 
12 
attend. But I think they ought to cooperate in knowing 
when they're going so they don't go at the same time. 
Mr. Young: Okay. 
Ms. Robinson: That's fine. 
Mr. West: I'm sorry. 
The Court: She'll inform him of the parent 
teacher conferences and they will go at different 
times. She'll tell him when she's going and he'll have 
to go the other time, whatever it is. 
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 12, lines 24-25, page 13, lines 
1-15) . 
The stipulation in the transcript favored Mrs. Robinson. She is 
to inform Mr. Lewis of the time she is going, and Mr. Lewis is to 
go the other available time. Reading the emphasized language in 
the Order, Mr. Lewis does not have to accept the direction of 
Mrs. Robinson. The Order should be changed to mirror the 
agreement made at the January, 1993 hearing that Mrs. Robinson is 
to inform Mr. Lewis of the time she is going, and Mr. Lewis is to 
go the other available time. 
Paragraph 4.x. of the Order also contains less than was 
agreed upon in open court. Paragraph 4.x. says: fl [a] child will 
be excused from visitation if he or she is ill, in which case 
there will be a make-up visitation the following weekend." That 
was the particular situation suggested by Mr. Lewis' counsel. 
The court expanded the excuse from visitation. 
Mr. West: I guess the other issue is if for 
instance Cammeron could not go with his Dad because of 
illness it could be made up the following weekend. 
The Court: Any problem with that? 
Ms. Robinson: No. 
The Court: Okay. I don't think I would limit it 
to illness. There maybe [sic] other things. Cammeron 
wants to go visit but maybe he has a Cub Scout meeting. 
He's going to -- and would rather do that and have 
visitation another night. And so -- or that time --
13 
Mr. Lewis: Are we talking weekends or just 
Wednesday, [sic] 
The Court: I'm talking right now Wednesday. I 
hope the parties will learn to be flexible about those 
things. The older the boy becomes the more independent 
he is going to become in regards to whether he does or 
doesn't visit. And whether Father likes it or not, 
he's going to find that some of the things that Boy 
wants to do are going to take precedent over what Dad 
wants to do. And that's something that a custodial 
parent lives with all the time, and the noncustodial 
parents have to live with it all the time, too. 
Mr. West: I guess it's also standard, other 
visitation mutually agreed upon? 
Ms. Robinson: Sure. 
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 10, lines 5-25, page 11, lines 
1-4) . 
Although the parties agreed that excuse from visitation would be 
more broad than the original suggestion of only in case of 
sickness, Mr. Lewis failed to include the actual agreement in the 
Order. The Order and the agreement shown by the record do not 
match. Paragraph 4.x. should be amended to permit the child to 
be excused from visitation "if he or she is ill, or has some 
activity which the child would prefer to attend, which conflicts 
with the visitation." 
Paragraphs 4.e. and 4.f. of the Order are also in error. 
Paragraph 4.e. states: [i]n even numbered years (1992, 1994, 
1996, etc.) the Defendant is to have Thanksgiving. Thanksgiving 
holiday is Wednesday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m." Paragraph 
4.f. states: [i]n odd numbered years (1993, 1995, 1997, etc.) the 
Defendant is to have Easter. Easter holiday is Friday 6:00 p.m. 
until Sunday 6:00 p.m. The "even-odd" year arrangement was never 
agreed to at the January, 1993 hearing. The transcript 
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discussion regarding Thanksgiving and Easter was much more 
limited. 
Mr. West: We would propose that Thanksgiving 
visitation be from Wednesday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 
6:00 p.m., and that one year, whoever has Thanksgiving, 
the other gets the Easter vacation. This year it was a 
four day holiday, at least with my children. The one 
party gets them for Thanksgiving and the other for 
Spring Break. 
Ms. Robinson: That's fine. 
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 3, line 25, page 4, lines 1-7). 
The inclusion of the "odd-even" arrangement is representative Of 
Mr. Lewis' continued efforts to exert control over the lives of 
Mrs. Robinson and her children. The "odd-even" provision 
relating to Thanksgiving and Easter should be stricken from the 
Order. The parties did not decide who would get which year. Mr. 
Lewis assigned his own opinion to the matter. 
Paragraph 4.g. reflects a similar "odd-even" arrangement 
which was not agreed to by stipulation at the hearing, either. 
That paragraph reads, in part: [i]n even numbered years the 
Defendant shall have Christmas visitation from the day the minor 
child is out of school until Christmas Day 2:00 p.m." The 
discussion regarding Christmas visitation was limited to how the 
actual school holiday was to be split between the parties. 
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 4, lines 8-25, page 5, page 6, 
lines 1-4)(Excerpt attached in Appendix). The Order as it stands 
gives Mr. Lewis both the Thanksgiving holiday and Christmas Eve 
and Christmas morning in the same year. Such an arrangement does 
not reflect the spirit of compromise evidenced by the 
stipulations reached by the parties. 
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Finally, paragraph 4.p. is not consistent with the agreement 
of the parties at the January, 1993 hearing. Paragraph 4.p. 
states: "Defendant to have visitation every Wednesday for three 
hours. The Defendant shall bring the child back no later than 
8:00 p.m. without the Plaintiff's approval during the school 
year. During school vacation and breaks the Defendant may bring 
back the child later than 8:00 p.m." The parties' agreement 
contemplated bringing the child back later than 8:00 p.m. during 
summer vacation or its equivalent in a year-round school. The 
record reads: 
The Court: Why don't we have it that it's three 
hours, but not later than 8:00 without her approval. 
And if it's a special event like a Jazz game or 
something --
Mr. Young: Or except in the summer. 
Ms. Robinson: Yeah, in the summer he can stay. 
The Court: During the school time, that it not be 
later than 8:00 without Mrs. Robinson's approval. In 
the summer it won't apply. Just in the school time. 
Mr. Young: Make it school time, because maybe 
they're going to have year round school. 
The Court: Yeah, that's a good idea. 
(Transcript of January, 1993 hearing, page 9, lines 4-16). 
According to the Order as it stands, Mr. Lewis can keep his child 
out past 8:00 p.m. without Mrs. Robinson's approval not only 
during summer vacation, but during any school break. That was 
not the intention of the parties, evidenced by the discussion 
just quoted. The Order Modifying Decree should be changed to 
reflect what the parties decided at the hearing. Paragraph 4.p. 
should be corrected to read: "Defendant is to have visitation 
every Wednesday for three hours. The Defendant shall bring the 
child back no later than 8:00 p.m. without the Plaintiff's 
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approval during the school year. During school summer vacation, 
or its equivalent in year round school, the Defendant may bring 
the child back later than 8:00 p.m." 
An obvious injustice will result if the foregoing changes 
are not made. The identified paragraphs show that Mr. Lewis, 
through his counsel, altered each agreement reached at the 
January, 1993 hearing. Some of the alterations are subtle and 
may seem of little consequence to this court. All of the 
alterations, however, are of significant consequence to Mrs. 
Robinson. In the past, Mr. Lewis used the visitation terms to 
antagonize Mrs. Robinson. In open court on January 15, 1993, the 
parties reached difficult and long sought compromises. Mr. Lewis 
again sought to antagonize and control Mrs. Robinson by subtly 
altering those agreements. It is inequitable to permit one party 
to unilaterally alter an agreement reached in open court. The 
judge signed the Order which Mr. Lewis presented as a reflection 
of the parties' agreement. The certified transcript shows that 
the Order does not reflect what actually happened at the January, 
1993 hearing. 
B. THE COMMON LAW SUPPORTS A NUNC PRO TUNC MODIFICATION. 
"While section 30-4a-l has a broad remedial scope, it does 
not abrogate all the common law trappings of nunc pro tunc law." 
Bacrshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990) . In our 
case, the errors must be of the type which the common law 
recognizes as errors to which a nunc pro tunc modification 
applies. Even though the trial court was presented with nine 
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identifiable errors in the Order Modifying Decree, the court 
denied Mrs. Robinson's efforts to obtain a nunc pro tunc 
modification. The denial was based on the trial court's belief 
that the errors were not of a type to which a nunc pro tunc 
modification applies. In its Memorandum Decision on the original 
motion to set aside the order or change the order nunc pro tunc, 
the trial court denied the motion, stating that the requested 
changes "are more than just mere clerical mistakes." (Statement 
of Facts, paragraph 14). In the Order on Mrs. Robinson's second 
motion to set aside or modify the order nunc pro tunc, from which 
this appeal arises, the court found good cause lacking. 
(Statement of Facts, paragraph 16). Although the court gave no 
specific reason for not finding good cause, the trial court 
referred to the general principles of common law nunc pro tunc 
modifications. (Order on Plaintiff's Second Motion to Set Aside 
Order, February 11, 1994, page 1). In both findings, the common 
law clearly supports Mrs. Robinson's request for a nunc pro tunc 
modification. 
At the common law, nunc pro tunc modifications are generally 
available when some clerical error occurs. Diehl Lumber Transp., 
Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah App. 1990) . Utah 
courts have often defined clerical error. "The distinction 
between a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend 
upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was made in 
rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered." 
Richards v. Siddoway. 471 P.2d 143, 145 (Utah 1970). In our 
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case, the error was clerical error. The error was in recording 
what occurred at the January, 1993 hearing. The judge signed an 
order which was presented to him as the summation of the parties' 
agreements in open court. The certified transcript shows that 
the order presented by Mr. Lewis did not accurately reflect what 
occurred at the hearing. 
Our case is similar to the case of Meagher v. Equity Oil 
Co., 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956). There, the court signed an order 
prepared by the counsel of one of the parties. The order did not 
match what happened at the trial. The other party petitioned the 
court to correct the order. The Utah Supreme Court held in favor 
of correcting the order. 
"This act did not reflect [the judge's] judgment, and, 
therefore, does not represent an error in judgment on 
his part. It was a mistake of a perfunctory or 
clerical nature apparently resulting from an erroneous 
assumption that the order as prepared by counsel 
correctly reflected the judgment of this and the lower 
court." 
Id. at 830. 
The certified transcript in our case shows that the order 
signed by the trial court differs from the stipulations reached 
by the parties in open court. The signing of the order does not 
represent an error in judgment by the trial court. Much like the 
trial court in Meagher, the court in our case was presented an 
order by Mr. Lewis' counsel. The judge signed the order under 
the assumption that the order accurately reflected what occurred 
at the January, 1993 hearing. The error was in recording the 
judgment, not in rendering the judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Robinson presented the trial court with nine 
identifiable instances in which the Order Modifying Decree did 
not match the agreements reached at trial. Although these 
differences may seem of little consequence to the court, they are 
of significant consequence to the appellant Mrs. Robinson. This 
type of error is that which is subject to nunc pro tunc 
modification under the common law. To permit Mr. Lewis to 
unilaterally and subtly alter the agreements is an obvious 
injustice. The trial court had adequate good cause under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l to modify the order, but did not. 
Based on the foregoing, appellant Ann F. Lewis, nka Ann Robinson 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order on 
Plaintiff's Second Motion to Set Aside Order, entered February 
11, 1994 and order the district court to enter an order: 
(1) modifying the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce nunc pro 
tunc to accurately reflect the stipulations of the parties as 
evidenced by the record of the January 15, 1993 hearing. 
Dated this day of . 1994. 
robnsn.brf 
BRENT D. Y0UN9 
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I hereby certify that on this /J day of 
1994, I caused to be mailed four true and correcz copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant Ann F. Lewis, nka Ann Robinson, to 
Greg Ross Lewis, Defendant/Appellee, postage prepaid, addressed 
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GREG ROSS LEWIS 
461 N. 800 West 
Lindon, UT 84042 
BRENT 
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APPENDIX 
1 FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1993. 
2 ANN ROBINSON VERSUS GREG LEWIS 
3 THE COURT: THIS IS CASE NUMBER 874401013, 
4 THE CASE OF LEWIS VERSUS LEWIS. AND MR. YOUNG? 
5 MR. YOUNG: YOUR HONOR, THE RECORD SHOULD 
6 REFLECT TEAT COUNSEL -- CAN YOU SEE ALL RIGHT? 
7 MR. WEST: I CAN HEAR, THAT'S THE MAIN THING. 
8 MR. YOUNG: — WE HAD A MEETING IN CHAMBERS. 
9 WE DISCUSSED THE EVALUATION, CUSTODY EVALUATION THAT WAS 
10 FILED SOMETIME AGO. AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE 
11 PRETRIAL ORDER FILED SO THE RECORD IS COMPLETE WITH 
12 RESPECT TO WHAT THE ISSUES WOULD HAVE BEEN. AND THEN I 
13 WOULD, BASED UPON WHAT THE COURT TOLD US IN CHAMBERS, I 
14 THINK IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA RATHER THAN JUST CONDUCT 
15 THIS AS A TRIAL, IF I WERE TO ADDRESS EACH ISSUE THAT IS 
16 SET FORTE IN THE PRETRIAL ORDER, I THINK THIS CASE WILL 
17 EVAPORATE, AT LEAST THE BETTER PART OF IT WILL EVAPORATE 
18 RATHER QUICKLY. MAY I DO THAT? 
19 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
20 MR. YOUNG: THE VISITATION -- THERE ARE THREE 
21 CHILDREN AND WE'VE TALKED ABOUT THE VISITATION AND MY 
22 CLIENT IS AGREEABLE TO ALMOST ANY SCHEDULE OF VISITATION 
23 FOR THE MINOR CHILD CAMMERON WHO IS ABOUT S. AND I 
24 UNDERSTAND VISITATION HAS NOT BEEN A PROBLEM FOR ABOUT A 
25 YEAR -- OR HOW LONG? 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
1 VISITATION BE FROM WEDNESDAY 6:00 P.M. UNTIL SUNDAY 6:00 
2 P.M., AND THAT ONE YEAR, WHOEVER HAS THANKSGIVING, THE 
3 OTHER GETS THE EASTER VACATION. THIS YEAR IT WAS A FOUR 
4 DAY HOLIDAY, AT LEAST WITH MY CHILDREN. THE ONE PARTY 
5 GETS THEM FOR THANKSGIVING AND THE OTHER FOR SPRING 
6 BREAK. 
7 MS. ROBINSON: THAT'S FINE. 
8 MR. WEST: I BELIEVE CHRISTMAS VISITATION IS 
9 SET UP ALL RIGHT THE WAY IT IS. THAT IS THEY ALTERNATE 
10 -- BASICALLY THEY SPLIT THE CHRISTMAS VACATION IN HALF. 
11 ONE YEAR THE ONE PARTY GETS THE FIRST HALF OF CHRISTMAS 
12 VACATION, AND THEN THE NEXT GETS THE LEFTOVER AMOUNT OF 
13 TIME AFTER THAT, BECAUSE THEY'RE OUT OF SCHOOL. 
14 THE COURT: USUALLY THE ONE AT THE BEGINNING 
15 GETS A SHORTER PERIOD OF TIME. 
16 MR. LEWIS: LIKE THIS YEAR I HAD THREE DAYS, 
17 WHICH DIDN'T MAKE IT REALLY TOG FAIR. 
18 MR. WEST: WHAT I'M SAYING, IS FOR INSTANCE 
19 THIS YEAR, SAY AS AN EXAMFLE MR. LEWIS — SAY IF IT WAS 
20 HIS TURN TO HAVE THEM AT THE FIRST OF CHRISTMAS VACATION 
21 AND IT WAS THREE DAYS THEY WERE OUT OF SCHOOL, TAKE THE 
22 THREE DAYS AND THEY'RE OUT OF SCHOOL 14 DAYS, HE'S 
23 ENTITLED TO FOUR MORE DAYS LATER AND SO IT BALANCES OUT 
24 THAT HE'LL HAVE SEVEN DAYS. I THINK EVERYBODY 
25 UNDERSTANDS WHAT I'M SAYING. 
CREED K. BARKER, CSR 
1 THE COURT: I THINK SO. AND EITHER WAY IS 
2 FAIR. MY' STANDARD ORDER, AND WHAT THEY'RE PROPOSING IS 
3 ACCEPTABLE TO THE COURT. MY STANDARD ORDER IS IT'S 
4 DIVIDED AT NOON OR 2 O'CLOCK ON CHRISTMAS DAY. AND I 
5 DON'T TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ANY ADDITIONAL TIME. AND THE 
6 REASON THAT TURNS OUT TO BE FAIR IS THE NEXT YEAR THE ONE 
7 THAT GOT THE SHORT — WELL THE ONE THAT GETS THE SHORT 
8 PORTION OF VACATION GETS CHRISTMAS EVE AND CHRISTMAS 
9 MORNING. AND THEN THE NEXT YEAR THEY WILL GET A LONGER 
10 AMOUNT OF VACATION. BUT THEY DON'T GET THE CHRISTMAS EVE 
11 OR CHRISTMAS MORNING. THAT'S HOW I STANDARDLY DO IT. 
12 BUT I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR PROPOSAL. 
13 MR. YOUNG: WE LIKE THE ONE THE COURT IS 
14 TALKING ABOUT, BUT WE'LL AGREE. 
15 MR. LEWIS: MY SON WANTS MORE TIME WITH ME. 
16 HE'S EXPRESSED THAT MANY TIMES. WHETHER IT'S 
17 CHRISTMASTIME OF. OTHER TIMES OF THE YEAR HE WANTS MORE 
18 TIME WITH ME. 
19 MF. WEST: WE'LL GET TO THAT. 
20 THE COURT: BUT THIS -- WE NEED TO MAKE A 
21 DETERMINATION ON THE CHRISTMAS VACATION. IF YOU WANT IT 
22 THAT WAY, COUNSEL, AS YOU'VE PROPOSED, I DON'T OBJECT TO 
23 IT. 
24 MR. WEST: DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I'VE SAID? 
25 MR. YOUNG: WILL YOU PUT IT IN WRITING? 
CREED H. BARKER, CSP. 
b 
1 MR. WEST: I'LL SEE IF I CAN STRAIGHTEN OUT 
2 WHAT I SAID IN WRITING, YES. 
3 THE COURT: I THINK WE UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT 
4 AND THAT'S ACCEPTABLE. 
5 MR. WEST: CURRENTLY MY CLIENT, UNDER THE 
6 DIVORCE DECREE, IS ENTITLED TO TWO PHONE CALLS A WEEK ON 
7 CERTAIN DAYS. I DON'T RECALL THE DAYS. WE WOULD JUST 
8 LIKE TO MAKE THAT REASONABLE PHONE CALLS. 
9 MR. YOUNG: THAT'S FINE. 
10 MR. WEST: IF THAT IS RIGHT -- YOU MIGHT CALL 
11 FOUR OR FIVE TIMES IN A WEEK, RATHER THAN JUST TWO. 
12 MR. LEWIS: WHAT I WANT TO DO IS ACCOMPLISH 
13 THINGS PEACEFULLY, SO THINGS ARE MADE SO WE DON'T HAVE TO 
14 BE RIGID ON ANYTHING; WE HAVE A FREE RELATIONSHIP GOING 
15 BACK AND FORTH. CALLS CAN BE MADE FREELY. SOMEBODY 
16 DOESN'T HAVE TO BE HOME AT A CERTAIN TIME TC TAKE THE 
17 PHONE CALL. 
18 THE COURT: I THINK THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT 
19 HOWEVER AS TO THE HOUR AFTER WHICH THE CALLS CAN BE MADE. 
20 MP. WEST: WE'RE SAYING REASONABLE CALLS AT 
21 REASONABLE TIMES. 
22 MR. YOUNG: GENERALLY BEFORE 8:00. 
2 3 THE COURT: LET'S HAVE IT BEFORE 8:00. I 
24 THINK THAT'S APPROPRIATE. 
25 MR. WEST: AND ALSO CAMMERON OR THE GIRLS CAN 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
Orson B. West, Jr. U166 
Attorney for Defendant 
669 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5951 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN F. LEWIS, nka, ) 
ANN ROBINSON ) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
) OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. CV 87 1013 
GREG ROSS LEWIS ) 
Defendant. ) Judge Ray M. Harding 
The above-entitled matter came on before the Court for hearing on January 15, 1993. The 
Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Brent D. Young. The 
.Defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Orson B. West, Jr. The 
Court having heard proffers from counsel, sworn testimony, and the parties having stipulated 
to some.matters, and being otherwise fullly advised in the premises, now, therefore, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED OR DECREED: 
1. That the Defendant may retain a qualified licensed independent therapist for the purpose 
of attempting to resolve issues that have developed between the Defendant and his daughters. 
2. The Plaintiff is ordered to cooperate with the therapist as recommended by the therapist. 
3. The Defendant is responsible for all costs of therapy not covered by insurance. 
4. The Defendant shall be entitled to the following visitation: 
a. Every other weekend from Friday 5:00 p.m. until Sunday 8:00 p.m. 
b. Every other holiday, said holidays being defined as follows: New Years' Day, Martin 
Luther King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, Labor Day, Veterens' 
Day, Thanksgiving Day; the non-custodial parent to have visitation beginning 6:00 p.m. the 
day before the holiday until 6:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
c. Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and no changes should be made 
to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend schedule; 
d. If said holiday falls on a three day weekend, then whichever party is entitled to have 
the children on that holiday shall have the children the entire weekend; 
e. In even numbered years (1992, 1994, 1996, etc.) the Defendant is to have 
Thanksgiving. Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m.; 
f. In odd numbered years (1993, 1995, 1997, etc.) the Defendant is to have Easter. 
Easter holiday is Friday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m. 
g. In even numbered years the Defendant shall have Christmas visitation from the day 
the minor child is out of school until Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. The Plaintiff shall have the 
Christmas visitation from Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. and the same number of days after 
Christmas that Defendant had prior to Christmas Day. Any remaining days of Christmas 
vacation shall be divided equally between the parties. In odd numbered years the parties 
shall reverse visitation, with the Plaintiff having Christmas visitation from the day the minor 
child is out of school until Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. The Defendant shall have the 
Christmas visitation from Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. and the same number of days after 
Christmas that the Plaintiff had prior to Christmas Day. Any remaining days of Christmas 
vacation shall be divided equally between the parties. 
h. Each party is entitled to reasonable telephone visitation with the parties' minor 
children generally before 8:00 p.m. 
i. The telephone visitation shall be without interference or monitoring by the other party 
or anyone else; 
j. The children should be allowed to freely call the other parent during periods of 
visitation. 
k. The Defendant is entitled to six weeks summer visitation if the minor child is in a 
traditional school. If the child goes to a year-round school, the Defendant is still entitled to 
six weeks extended visitation, but not to interfere with the child's schooling. Defendant 
shall give Plaintiff 30 days. 
1. Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year uninterrupted possession of the 
children for purposes of vacation, provided the same does not interfere with holiday 
visitation per above. Each parent shall notify the other in writing of such two week period 
at least 30 days in advance. 
m. If Defendant exercises his summer visitation in periods of two weeks or longer, then 
Plaintiff shall have reciprocal visitation that is provided to Defendant. 
n. Father's Day and Mother's Day as appropriate, 6:00 p.m. the day before until 6:00 
p.m. the day of; 
o. Defendant's birthday, Plaintiff to have her birthday. 
p. Defendant to have visitation every Wednesday for three hours. The Defendant shall 
bring the child back no later than 8:00 p.m. without the Plaintiffs approval during the 
school year. During school vacation and breaks the Defendant may bring back the child later 
than 8:00 p.m. 
q. Any other visitation the parties mutually agree upon. 
r. The Plaintiff shall keep Defendant informed of the children's extra-curricular activities 
such as church, scouting, little league, school, etc. 
s. The Defendant may attend Parent-Teacher conference, but he shall coordinate with 
Plaintiff so that they go at different times. 
t. Any missed visitation shall be made up as soon as possible. 
u. The Plaintiff shall inform Defendant of any health concerns of the children. 
v. The parties shall not use the children as messengers, but shall discuss visitation and 
other appropriate issues directly with each other. 
w. All visitation shall be exercised in a prompt manner so that both parties may rely on 
the schedule outlined above in making plans. The non-custodial parent will pick-up the 
children from the front of the Plaintiff's residence no earlier than 15 minutes prior and no 
later than 15 minutes after the appointed hour, and shall return the children no later than 15 
minutes after the appointed hour. 
x. A child will be excused from visitation if he or she is ill, in which case there will be a 
make-up visitation the following weekend. 
y. It is fair and reasonable that the base child support is reduced by 50% for each child 
and for time periods during which specific extended visitation of the child with the non-
custodial parent is granted in the order far at least 25 of any consecutive 30 days. 
z. Each party shall maintain health insurance if available through their places of 
employment. 
aa. The parties shall exchange insurance carrier information and cooperate in filing 
/claims with the insurance companies. 
bb. Each party shall give to the other party a copy of any medical bills within seven 
days of receipt of said bill. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for one-half if unreimbursed medical 
expenses in the sum of $474.59, provided Plaintiff provide Defendant with an itemized 
breakdown of such costs within 30 days of the date of the trial, to be paid upon receiving his 
severance pay. 
6. Based upon the parties' relative need and ability to pay, the Court is satisfied that each 
party should pay their own attorney's fees. 
The Court is satisfied that both parties, especially the Plaintiff, now understands the 
importance of visitation and will cooperate is seeing that it is accomplished to the fullesat 
extent possible. 
DATED this day of March, 1993. 
Honorable Ray M. Harding 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Brent D. Young 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN F. LEWIS, nka ANN ROBINSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG ROSS LEWIS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 874401013 
DATE: September 13, 1993 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Joe Morton 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling on Plaintiffs motion titled Motion to Set 
Aside Order which asked the court to modify the order nunc pro tunc. Having reviewed the 
Motion and casefile, the Court hereby denies the Motion. 
On May 19th, 1993, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision overruling Plaintiffs 
earlier Objection to Proposed Order and Request for Additional Time to Obtain Transcript 
finding the Plaintiffs objection untimely. The objection was based on the allegation that the 
language in the modification to the Decree of Divorce was materially different from that 
agreed to in the stipulation it was based on. The motion to modify the order nunc pro tunc 
seeks to change the same language. These changes are more than just mere clerical 
mistakes. Counsel's letters point out the sharp differences of opinion in what each believed 
the order of the Court was. As such, an amendment nunc pro tunc is inappropriate. 
Plaintiff has waived her right to object to the modification as submitted by not 
objecting in a timely manner. The modification stands as ordered. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 13th day of September, 1993. 
cc: Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Orson B. West, Esq. 
Orson B. West, Jr. #4166 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West Ste. 215 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ,. 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAN 311994 
vie & Young 
ANN F. LEWIS, NKA ANN, ] 
ROBINSON j 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
GREG ROSS LEWIS, ] 
Defendant. 
' ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
\ SECOND MOTION TO 
1 SET ASIDE ORDER 
i Civil No. 874401013 
1 Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter came before the Court for ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing of Motion to 
Set Aside Order to Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc. Having reviewed the motion and casefile, 
the Court hereby denies the motion. 
On September 13, 1993, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision refusing to grant 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order. This motion has asked the court to modify its previous 
order nunc pro tunc. Plaintiff now asks the Court to reconsider. 
Utah Code Annotated 30-4a-l allows the court, in its "broad discretion,,/ to enter orders 
nunc pro tunc in domestic matters when "good cause" is shown. Bagshaw vs. Bagshaw, 788 P. 
2d 1057, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Home vs. Home, 737 P. 2d 244, 248 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). "Good cause" is to be found in the "surrounding circumstances, as justice and equity and 
justice require." Id. " The general principles of the common law of nunc pro tunc", such as 
whether the mistake was attributable to the court as opposed to being attributable to the 
parties, "are relevant, if not controlling, in a determination of good cause." Bagshaw at 1060-61. 
This Court entered an Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce on March 31,1993. Plaintiffs 
counsel did not object to the modification or request an extension of time to make an objection. 
On April 22, 1993, Plaintiffs counsel did file and objection and it was overruled. The Court 
was not persuaded then, or now, with the argument that the untimely objection should be 
allowed because the Plaintiff was awaiting an otficial copy of the hearing transcript. The 
Plaintiff had a copy of the reporters computer assisted transcript and if more time were needed 
for the official transcript, a timely request for such should have been made. 
1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order is denied. 
2. The modifications of the Decree of Divorce entered on or about March 31,1993 stands as 
ordered. 
DATED this / / day of January, 1994. 
Approved as to form: 
Brent D. Young 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
M 
Honoi lorable Ray M. Harding 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be faxed and mailed 
on this-ti_ day of January, 1994 to: 
Brent D. Young 
IVIE AND YOUNG 
Attorneys at Law 
48 North University Ave. 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
FAX# 375-3067 
2 
BAGSHAW v. BAGSHAW 
Cite as 788 ?2d 1057 (UtahApp. 1990) 
Utah 1057 
to pay these fees would be an appropriate 
sanction—indeed, not to so require under 
those circumstances might be an abuse of 
discretion—regardless of whether plain-
tiffs ultimately prevailed on the claim in 
connection with which the discovery was 
sought. But again, our record is deficient 
It contains nothing to suggest the master 
was appointed in response to a motion to 
compel discovery nor does it otherwise en-
lighten us as to the circumstances of the 
master's appointment. Accordingly, the 
trial court's treatment of this issue cannot 
be disturbed. 
Finally, I note that I do not regard the 
legal issues raised in this appeal to be 
frivolous. The difficulty with this appeal is 
that plaintiffs did not provide us with a 
record adequate to allow us to meaningful-
ly consider the merit of the issues raised. 
I join in the court's judgment of affirm-
ance. 
f O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Wanda Marie Sackett BAGSHAW, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph Arthur BAGSHAW, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 880647-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 8, 1990. 
Former wife filed order to show cause 
seeking judgment for alimony arrearages. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
J. Dennis Frederick, J., entered judgment 
for former wife and former husband ap-
pealed. Former wife cross-appealed re-
questing attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held 
that: (1) "good cause" did not exist to 
order termination of former wife's alimony 
under domestic nunc pro tunc statute; (2) 
former wife was not estopped from collect-
ing alimony arrearages despite 15-year de-
lay in enforcing alimony order; and (3) 
former wife was not entitled to attorney 
fees incurred on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
1. Stipulations $=»6, 7 
Reliance on Code of Judicial Adminis-
tration Rule that requires stipulations to be 
in writing or amended in open court to be 
enforceable was misplaced where nothing 
in record established that rule was in effect 
at time of putative stipulation. Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-504(8). 
2. Courts <3=>85(1) 
Court will not apply amended rule of 
procedure if it impairs the rights of a par-
ty. 
3. Divorce e=>162 
In marital law area, courts may enter 
orders nunc pro tunc upon showing of good 
cause. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l. 
4. Divorce <s=>247 
Domestic nunc pro tunc statute was 
specific statute intended to cover situation 
where husband requested that trial court 
enter order nunc pro tunc to enforce al-
leged prior oral agreement of parties that 
alimony would terminate, not the more gen-
eral procedural rule on written stipulations. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l; Judicial Administra-
tion Rule 4-504(8). 
5. Appeal and Error <3=>854(1) 
Appellate court may affirm trial 
court's decision if it can be sustained on 
any proper legal basis. 
6. Divorce <3=>162 
Decision whether to enter nunc pro 
tunc order in domestic proceeding is eq-
uitable one. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l. 
7. Divorce e=*162 
Although statutory provision govern-
ing nunc pro tunc orders in domestic pro-
ceedings has broad remedial scope, it does 
not abrogate ali common-law trappings of 
nunc pro tunc law. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l. 
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8. Motions <e=»56(2) 
At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed 
court to correct its earlier error or supply 
its omission so record accurately reflected 
that which had in fact taken place. 
9. Judgment <3=>273(5), 326 
Courts have traditionally applied nunc 
pro tunc doctrine in cases where one of the 
parties died after submission of case to 
court for decision, but before actual rendi-
tion of judgment and where judgment was 
rendered by lower court, but clerk failed to 
perform ministerial function of entry. 
10. Divorce <3=>162 
General common-law principles of nunc 
pro tunc are relevant, if not controlling, in 
determination of good cause under statu-
tory provision governing nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic proceeding. U.C.A.1953, 
30-4a-l. 
11. Divorce ®=>247 
Fact that court never received written 
stipulation mentioned in minute entry could 
alone support finding of lack of "good 
cause" and court's refusal to enter order 
nunc pro tunc to enforce alleged prior oral 
agreement of former husband and wife 
that alimony would terminate. U.C.A.1953, 
30-4a-l. 
12. Divorce «=>247 
"Good cause" required for entry of 
nunc pro tunc order was not present wherfe 
the parties did not enter into enforceable 
stipulation to modify decree of divorce to 
terminate alimony by former husband to 
former wife and there was no termination 
of alimony by reason of actions of former 
wife. 
13. Divorce <3»277 
Former wife was not estopped from 
collecting alimony arrearages where she 
did not unlawfully cohabitate after entry of 
divorce decree and did not otherwise en-
gage in actions which would provide basis 
for termination of alimony, notwithstand-
ing fact that she waited 15 years before 
attempting to collect arrearages. 
14. Costs <3=>252 
Court of Appeals may order either par-
ty to pay attorney fees and this includes 
fees incurred on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-
3. 
15. Divorce <3=>288 
Former wife was not entitled to attor-
ney fees incurred on appeal where she 
failed to challenge court's denial of attor-
ney fees below, failed to assert on appeal 
any facts in addition to those presented to 
trial court concerning her financial need, 
did not claim her situation had deteriorated 
since trial, and was awarded substantial 
judgment for arrearages which could be 
used to satisfy fees. 
Randall T. Gaither, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
John Spencer Snow, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant, Joseph Arthur Bagshaw 
("Husband"), appeals the trial court's order 
awarding respondent, Wanda Marie Sack-
ett Bagshaw ("Wife"), $19,400 in alimony 
arrearages owing under a divorce decree 
entered on January 10, 1973. We affirm. 
Wife filed a complaint for divorce seek-
ing $100 per month in support for each of 
the couple's two children and $200 per 
month in alimony. Husband, unrepre-
sented by counsel, agreed that a default 
divorce could be entered against him on 
Wife's complaint. Husband now claims he 
cannot read and he signed the divorce pa-
pers based on Wife's alleged representa-
tions that she wanted only child support 
and some furniture. 
A divorce decree was entered on January 
10, 1973, which included the amounts of 
child support and alimony requested in the 
complaint. After the divorce, Husband 
learned of the alimony provision and filed 
an Order to Show Cause seeking modifica-
tion of the decree to terminate the alimony 
award. The matter was set for hearing on 
BAGSHAW v. BAGSHAW 
Cite at 788 P.2d 1057 (UtahApp. 1990) 
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November 28, 1973. On the day of the 
scheduled hearing, Husband, his second 
wife, and his attorney met with Wife's at-
torney to discuss the case. Wife was not 
present because of threats made to her by 
Husband. Husband contends that at this 
meeting, Wife, through a telephone conver-
sation with her attorney, agreed to the 
termination of alimony. Wife contends she 
never agreed to a termination of alimony. 
Neither attorney who participated in this 
meeting has any recollection of the events. 
A minute entry reflected that a stipula-
tion was reached between the parties and 
the matter was continued pending a writ-
ten stipulation and order. However, no 
stipulation was ever entered into the 
record. Husband asserts he thought the 
issue was resolved even though he request-
ed a copy of the papers and admits he 
never received those papers. 
From November 28, 1973, to February 
25, 1988, Wife did not seek to enforce the 
alimony order. Because she was on public 
assistance, Wife had assigned her right to 
payments from Husband to the Office of 
Recovery Services, which only collected 
child support payments from Husband. 
On February 25, 1988, Wife filed an Or-
der to Show Cause seeking judgment for 
alimony arrearages. Husband requested 
the court to enforce the previous alleged 
oral agreement terminating alimony by en-
tering a nunc pro tunc order as provided 
for in Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1989), or, 
in the alternative, to find that Wife was 
estopped from collecting the alimony be-
cause of her conduct. 
1. We note there is a conflict within this court 
concerning whether all settlement agreements 
are "stipulations" covered by the Code of Judi-
cial Administration Rule 4-504(8). In Brown v. 
Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct.App.1987), this 
court found that stipulations must be in writing 
or submitted in open court to be enforceable, id 
at 335, relying, in part, on the predecessor to 
rule 4-504(8). In Zions First Natl Bank v. Bar-
bara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989), another panel of this court found 
that certain settlement agreements need not be 
in writing to be enforceable. Id at 480 n. 1. 
We agree with Judge Bench's dissent in Zions 
that the two cases are not distinguishable. Be-
cause of our holding, we need not directly con-
The trial court found that no enforceable 
stipulation had been reached to eliminate 
alimony. The court further found that 
Wife had not cohabited since the divorce 
nor should she otherwise be estopped from 
collecting the arrearages. The court 
awarded Wife $19,400 in arrearages and 
ordered both parties to pay their own attor-
ney fees and costs. 
Husband appeals, claiming the trial court 
erred in (1) failing to properly apply Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1989) to this action, 
and (2) finding that Wife was not estopped 
from collecting the alimony arrearages. 
Wife cross-appeals, requesting her attorney 
fees incurred on appeal. 
ENFORCEABILITY OF STIPULATION 
The trial court refused to enforce Hus-
band and Wife's alleged oral agreement to 
terminate alimony as of 1973. The court 
relied upon a procedural rule relevant to 
the enforceability of in-court stipulations, 
concluding: "This court finds that there 
was neither a stipulation between the par-
ties as evidenced by a signed writing nor 
an agreement of the parties stated in court 
before a judge on the record as required by 
Brown v. Brovm, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah, App. 
1987)." l In essence, the trial court found 
that-any alleged "stipulation" of the par-
ties to terminate alimony in 1973 was not in 
writing nor entered into in open court as 
required by Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-504(8)2 and was therefore unen-
forceable. 
[1,2] We believe the trial court's re-
liance on rule 4-504(8) was misplaced. 
First, there is nothing in the record to 
sider this issue. However, the author agrees 
with the majority in Zions that all agreements 
settling pending litigation need not meet the 
procedural requirements of rule 4-504(8) in or-
der to be enforcable. 
2. Rule 4-504(8), the substantially similar succes-
sor to Utah R.PracDist. & Cir.Ct. 4.5(b). pro-
vides that M[n]o orders, judgments, or decrees 
based upon stipulation shall be signed or en-
tered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed 
by the attorneys of record for the respective 
parties and filed with the clerk or the stipula-
tion was made on the record." 
1060 Utah 788 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
establish that this procedural rule was in 
effect at the time of the putative stipula-
tion in 1973.3 This court will not apply an 
amended rule of procedure if it impairs the 
rights of a party. Jensen v. Fames, 30 
Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974). 
Furthermore, "[u]nder general rules of 
statutory construction, where two statutes 
treat the same subject matter, and one 
statute is general while the other is specif-
ic, the specific provision controls." Floyd 
v. Western Surgical Assocs., Inc., 773 P.2d 
401, 404 (Utah Ct.App.1989); see also State 
v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1983); 
Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1209 
(Utah 1980); State v. Bumham, 87 Utah 
445, 49 P.2d 963, 965 (1935). 
[3] Husband requested the trial court in 
a domestic case to enter an order nunc pro 
tunc to enforce the alleged prior oral agree-
ment of the parties that alimony would 
terminate. In the marital law area, Utah 
permits courts to enter orders nunc pro 
tunc upon a showing of good cause: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon 
its finding of good cause and giving of 
such notice as may be ordered, enter an 
order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating 
to marriage, divorce, legal separation or 
annulment of marriage. .^-. ^ 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1989)7)jqs£*. 
[4] We believe the domeslicnunc pro 
tunc statute is the specific statute intended 
to cover this situation, not the more gener-
al procedural rule on written stipulations 
found in rule 4-504(8). If we were to find 
otherwise, rule 4-504(8) would, in effect, 
repeal the domestic nunc pro tunc statute, 
section 30-4a-l, as it would seldom apply. 
[5] Although the trial court focused on 
the general procedural enforceability of a 
stipulation rather than on whether a nunc 
pro tunc order was appropriate under the 
facts presented, this court may affirm "if 
the trial court's decision can be sustained 
on any proper legal basis." Taylor v. Es-
tate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). Thus, we must determine if 
3. Nor is there evidence in the record that the 
prior Utah R.Prac.Dist. & Cir.Ct. 4.5(b) was in 
the findings of the court below or the un-
disputed evidence in the record support a 
decision not to enter a nunc pro tunc order 
under section 30-4a-l. 
[6] In Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244 
(Utah Ct.App.1987), this court interpreted 
the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l 
(1989). The Home court stated that "the 
legislative history reveals an intent to give 
the courts broad discretion to enter orders 
nunc pro tunc in domestic proceedings 
where an obvious injustice would otherwise 
result." Id. at 248. Thus, the inquiry is an 
equitable one. 
The Home court held section 30-4a-l 
eliminated the common law nunc pro tunc 
requirement of a previously-entered final 
order and concluded that all that is re-
quired under the statute is a finding of 
"good cause." Id. The court stated that 
"[t]he meaning of 'good cause* must be 
determined on a case by case basis, in light 
of all of the surrounding circumstances, as 
equity and justice require." Id. at 248-49. 
[7-9] While section 30-4a-l has a broad 
remedial scope, it does not abrogate all the 
common law trappings of nunc pro tunc 
law. At common law, nunc pro tunc al-
lowed a court to correct its earlier error or 
supply its omission so the record accurate-
ly reflected that which in fact had taken 
place. Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 
(Utah 1984); Home, 737 P.2d at 246. 
Cases in which courts traditionally have 
applied the nunc pro tunc doctrine fall into 
two categories: 
(1) those in which one of the parties died 
after the submission of the case to the 
lower court for its decision, but before 
the actual rendition of judgment; and (2) 
those in which a judgment has in fact 
been rendered by the lower court, but 
the clerk has failed to perform the minis-
terial function of entry. 
6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
11 58.08 (1989). 
The second category is based upon the 
principle that "where the delay in render-
effect. 
BAGSHAW v. BAGSHAW 
Cite as 788 PJd 1057 (UtaJiApp. 1990) 
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ing judgment or decree arises from the act 
of the court, that is, where the delay has 
been for its convenience, or has been 
caused by the multiplicity or press of busi-
ness or the intricacy of the questions in-
volved, or of any other cause not attribut-
able to the laches of the parties, but within 
the control of the court; the judgment or 
the decree may be entered retrospective-
ly. . . . " Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 
64-65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881) (emphasis add-
ed); see also 6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice H 58.08 (1989). 
[10,11] These general principles of the 
common law of nunc pro tunc are relevant, 
if not controlling, in a determination of 
good cause under section 30-4a-l. In this 
case, the court did not make the clerical 
error, but taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Husband, Husband did. It 
is undisputed that the court never received 
the written stipulation mentioned in the 
minute entry. Thus, this alone could sup-
port a finding of lack of "good cause" 
under section 30-4a-l. 
[12] Furthermore, a nunc pro tunc or-
der must, even under the more liberal re-
quirements of section 30-4a-l, still be en-
tered for the purpose of making the record 
reflect what actually was meant to happen 
at a prior time. Thus, in determining good 
cause in our case, the threshold inquiry is 
(1) did Husband and Wife clearly agree 
that alimony would be terminated in 1973, 
and (2) was the court prepared in 1973 to 
enter an order based upon that agreement? 
The court found that "[t]he parties did not 
enter into any enforceable stipulation to 
modify the decree of divorce to terminate 
alimony by the defendant to the plaintiff," 
and "[t]here was no termination of alimony 
by reason of the actions of the plaintiff." 
Again, the court's findings support a con-
clusion that the "good cause" required for 
the entry of an order nunc pro tunc under 
section 30-4a-l was not present. 
Thus, although the magic words "good 
cause" were not recited by the court in its 
findings, the sum and substance of the 
court's ruling and the undisputed evidence 
in the record indicate that no "obvious in-
justice" resulted from enforcing the prior 
alimony order as entered in 1973. 
ESTOPPEL 
[13] Husband argues in the alternative 
that Wife should be estopped from collect-
ing the alimony arrearages because she 
cohabited after the divorce and unreason-
ably delayed the filing of her action to 
collect alimony arrearages. In Ross v. 
Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979), the court 
recognized the theory that a spouse may be 
estopped from collecting back installments, 
but refused to apply the doctrine. The 
court set out the requirements that must 
be met before a court will apply the doc-
trine: 
In order to prevail on his theory of 
estoppel, plaintiff must prove that defen-
dant, by her representations or actions 
led plaintiff to believe he need not pay 
alimony or child support, and that plain-
tiff, in reliance on said representations, 
changed his position to his detriment. In 
such a case, enforcement of the decree 
creates a hardship and injustice to plain-
tiff, and defendant would be estopped to 
deny her own misrepresentations, and es-
topped from claiming unpaid support. 
Id. at 602-03 (footnote omitted). 
The trial court heard evidence and found 
that Wife did not engage in unlawful co-
habitation after the entry of the divorce 
decree nor did her actions otherwise consti-
tute a basis for the termination of alimony. 
The trial court's findings support a conclu-
sion that Wife should not be estopped from 
collecting alimony arrearages and we 
therefore find no error. 
ATTORNEY PEES 
[14,15] Finally, Wife asserts she has no 
resources to meet her legal expenses and 
requests attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
We may order either party to pay attorney 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1989), and this includes attorney fees in-
curred on appeal. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 
465, 470 (Utah Ct.App.1989). See, e.g.t 
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah 
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1978); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 
156, 162-63 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
Two requirements must be met before a 
court will award attorney fees: "the trial 
court must find the requesting party is in 
need of financial assistance and that the 
fees requested are reasonable." Riche, 
784 P.2d at 470; see generally Newmeyer 
v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279-80 (Utah 
1987); Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 
(Utah 1984); Andersen v. Andersen, 757 
P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
The trial court heard evidence on need 
and chose not to award Wife attorney fees 
and costs. Wife does not challenge the 
court's denial of attorney fees below nor 
does she assert on appeal any facts in 
addition to those presented to the trial 
court concerning her financial need. She 
does not claim her situation has dete-
riorated since the trial as tne appellant did 
in Riche. Furthermore, wife was awarded 
a substantial judgment for arrearages in 
alimony which could be used to satisfy her 
fees. Based on the foregoing, we deny 
Wife's request for attorney fees incurred 
on appeal. 
In conclusion, we find that no "good 
cause" exists to order the termination of 
Wife's alimony as of 1973 under the domes-
tic nunc pro tunc statute, section 30-4a-l. 
Further, we find that the trial court did not 
err in its decision that Wife should not be 
estopped from collecting her alimony ar-
rearages and, thus, we affirm the trial 
court's decision awarding Wife $19,400 in 
alimony arrearages. Finally, we deny 
Wife's claim for attorney fees incurred on 
appeal. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., concur 
in the result. 
f o | MY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Luis Lee MAESTAS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 890054-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 8, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
Circuit Court, Davis County, S. Mark John-
son, J., of driving under the influence of 
alcohol, and he appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Davidson, J., held that: (1) initial 
encounter between police officer and defen-
dant was not an illegal stop and seizure; 
(2) officer's affidavit describing test results 
of intoxilyzer machine was accurate; and 
(3) admission of affidavits regarding main-
tenance of intoxilyzer machine was reversi-
ble error. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Automobiles <3=349(18) 
Initial encounter between motorist and 
police officer, where officer approached 
motorist and asked questions, was not an 
illegal stop and seizure; motorist did not 
raise any objection to officer's inquiry nor 
did it appear that motorist was detained 
against his will. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
2. Automobiles e=>424 
Police officer's affidavit which indi-
cated that intoxilyzer machine was func-
tioning properly, even though officer 
checked box indicating that machine was 
equipped with fixed absorption calibrator 
when machine was not equipped with such 
a device, did not render test results inade-
quate in the absence of evidence disclosing 
a defect. 
3. Automobiles <s=>424, 425 
Custodian affidavit and intoxilyzer test 
record affidavit were admissible in prosecu-
tion for driving under the influence of alco-
hol where affidavits showed on their face 
that affiants attested from their own per-
sonal knowledge. 
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is otherwise affirmed. Each party shall 
bear his or her own costs of appeal. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
Dawn W. HORNE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
W. Reid HORNE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860060-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1987. 
The 3rd District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered nunc 
pro tunc order distributing property inci-
dent to previously granted divorce. Ex-
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that: (1) statute commit-
ting broad discretion to trial courts in 
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic 
relations matters was not limited in scope 
to cases involving marital status of the 
parties; (2) statute eliminated the common-
law requirement of previously made final 
order; and (3) good cause did not exist for 
entry of the order nunc pro tunc. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Courts <3=»114 
The court has the power to act nunc 
pro tunc—to do act upon one date and 
make it effective as of prior date; the 
common-law power of nunc pro tunc allows 
the court to correct errors or supply omis-
sions to permit the record to accurately 
reflect that which in fact took place. U.C. 
A.1953, 30-4a-l. 
2. Statutes <s=>189 
In construing legislative enactments, 
the reviewing court assumes that each 
term in the statute was used advisedly, and 
thus, interprets and applies the statute ac-
cording to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
3. Divorce <3=>254(1) 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations was not limited 
in scope to cases involving marital status of 
the parties, but could also apply to proper-
ty division problems; by its wording, the 
statute applies to any and all matters relat-
ing to divorce proceedings. U.C.A. 1953, 
30-4a-l. 
4. Statutes <s=>222, 239 
Statutes are not to be construed as 
effecting any change in the common law 
beyond that which is clearly indicated; 
however, where statute is in derogation of 
the common law, and is also remedial in 
nature, the remedial application should be 
construed so as to give effect to its pur-
pose. 
5. Divorce <3=>162 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations matters eliminat-
ed the common-law nunc pro tunc require-
ment of previously made final order; literal 
reading of statute indicated legislative in-
tent to change standard for entry of nunc 
pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings 
from requiring previously made final order 
as delineated by common law to requiring 
finding of "good cause," and legislative 
history indicated that statute was remedial 
in nature; Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 
(Utah), superseded by statute. U.C.A. 1953, 
30-4a-l. 
6. Divorce <^254(1) 
"Good cause" did not exist to enter 
nunc pro tunc order distributing property 
incident to previously granted divorce; 
agreement between parties expressly stat-
ed that property was to be transferred to 
equalize the marital assets in order to in-
sure that the transfer of property would 
not be taxable event, and in entering order 
prior to effective date of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 and without the essential and 
HORNE v. 
Clle a* 737 P-2d 244 
agreed upon tax language, the trial court 
either misunderstood how critical the tax 
language was to the parties' agreement or 
substituted its own judgment for that of 
the parties. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l. 
Richard K. Crandall, Rodney R. Parker, 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant. 
Dawn W. Home, pro se. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD 
and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's 
entry nunc pro tunc of an order distribut-
ing property incident to a previously grant-
ed divorce. We reverse the district court. 
The parties were divorced on January 27, 
1984. The divorce action was bifurcated 
with the four day property division trial to 
begin on June 19,1984. On the second day 
of the trial, June 20, 1984, the parties en-
tered into an oral property settlement 
agreement on the record. The record re-
flects the property was to be transferred in 
order "to equalize the marital assets of the 
parties." 
The court approved the agreement and 
requested plaintiffs counsel to prepare an 
order reflecting the oral stipulation. De-
fendant's counsel objected to the prepared 
order as it did not indicate the transfer was 
to "equalize the marital assets," language 
which was determinative as to the tax con-
sequences of the agreement. The court 
therefore set a hearing on August 8, 1984 
to consider the dispute over the tax lan-
guage. 
The dispute over the terms of the agree-
ment is best understood with reference to 
federal tax law. Prior to July 18, 1984, 
taxation of marital property settlements 
depended on the terms of the court's order 
or the parties' agreement. In United 
States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 82 S.Ct. 1190, 
8 L.Ed.2d 335 (1962), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a transfer of mar-
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ital property incident to divorce was a sale 
or exchange, and thus a taxable event. Id. 
at 71, 82 S.Ct. at 1193. This imposed upon 
the transferring party tax liability for capi-
tal gains on the property up to the date of 
transfer, and provided the recipient party a 
stepped-up basis in the property reflecting 
its value as of the date of the transfer. 
See I.R.C. § 1001. 
In several revenue rulings after Davist 
the Internal Revenue Service delineated a 
now well-recognized exception to the Davis 
rule: if the transaction was an attempt to 
equally divide marital assets, and this was 
clearly indicated in the agreement, there 
was no taxable event within the meaning of 
Davis. See Rev.Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 
26; Rev.Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158. The 
parties' dispute over the terms to be includ-
ed in the order relates to whether the 
agreement constituted a tax free equal divi-
sion of marital assets or a taxable transfer 
of property. 
While the parties were negotiating over 
the terms of the order, President Reagan 
signed into law the Tax Reform Act of 
1984, Pub.L. No. 98-369. The Reform Act 
overruled Davis and provided that no gain 
or loss will be recognized to the transferor 
in the case of transfers of property incident 
to a divorce. Further, the Act provided 
that the basis of the property transferred 
will carry over and become the basis of the 
property in the hands of the transferee. 
Tax Reform Act § 421, adding I.R.C. 
§ 1041 and amending I.R.C. §§ 1015 and 
1239. Thus, for plaintiff to receive a 
stepped-up basis in the property she re-
ceived as a result of the property settle-
ment agreement, the order must have been 
entered prior to the effective date of the 
Reform Act, July 18, 1984, and could not 
contain language that the transfer was to 
equalize the marital assets. 
Also in this interim period a dispute 
arose between plaintiff and her counsel. 
Plaintiff alleged, among other charges of 
misconduct, that she agreed to the settle-
ment only upon her counsel's representa-
tion that she would get the stepped-up ba-
sis and his stipulation in court to the con-
trary was against her instructions. 
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At the August 8 hearing, the court con-
sidered the charges against plaintiffs 
counsel, the dispute over the language to 
be contained in the proposed order, and 
whether the order should be entered nunc 
pro tunc to the date of June 20, 1984. 
Plaintiff claimed that unless she received 
the stepped-up basis, the property division 
was inequitable and unacceptable. Defend-
ant contended the parties' oral stipulation 
expressly included language that the 
agreement was an equal division of the 
parties' assets in order to insure that the 
transfer of property was not a taxable 
event. The record supports defendant's 
contention. The district court eliminated 
any reference in the decree to tax conse-
quences and on August 17, 1984 entered its 
Order of property division nunc pro tunc 
to June 20, 1984. 
The effect of the court's ruling was that 
the transfer of property was a taxable 
event because there was no specific lan-
guage to the contrary, and the plaintiff 
received a stepped-up basis in the property 
transferred. Plaintiff then withdrew all 
charges of misconduct against her counsel. 
On appeal defendant alleges the court 
erred in entering the decree nunc pro 
tunc. 
I. 
[1] The court has the power to act 
nunc pro tunc—to do an act upon one date 
and make it effective as of a prior date. 
Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 62, 
64-65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881); Kettner v. 
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 384, 375 P.2d 28, 30 
(1962). The common law power of nunc 
pro tunc allows the court to correct errors 
or supply omissions so the record accurate-
ly reflects that which in fact took place. 
Kettner, 13 Utah 2d at 384, 375 P.2d at 30. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court con-
sidered the application of the doctrine of 
nunc pro tunc in a divorce action: 
A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make 
the record speak the truth; it may not be 
used to correct the court's failure to 
speak. In other words, the function of a 
nunc pro tunc order is not to make an 
order now for then, but to enter now for 
then an order previously made. 
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 
1984) (citations omitted). 
In Preece, the trial court read its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and 
decree of divorce into the record following 
a trial between the parties. The husband's 
counsel objected to the attorneys' fees in-
cluded in the proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law but submitted the mat-
ter to the court for resolution. Prior to the 
court's signing of the decree, the husband 
died of a heart attack. To prevent the wife 
from receiving a portion of her husband's 
estate, the trial court entered the decree 
nunc pro tunc as of the trial date. The 
supreme court vacated the trial court's ac-
tion despite the harsh result. 
The Preece court held the entry of the 
decree nunc pro tunc was improper be-
cause until the decree was signed the trial 
court retained the ability to alter its terms, 
which meant there had not been a final 
resolution of the matter at the date of the 
trial. Specifically, the court stated: 
The determinative factor which prevents 
the use of nunc pro tunc in the instant 
case is the lack of signature on a decree 
and the attendant ability of the court to 
alter the terms of the decree until it was 
signed and entered. Additionally, the 
dispute over the substantive issue of at-
torney fees (in spite of respondent's 
counsel's indication that he would leave 
its resolution to the trial court) points to 
a lack of finality. Because the judge's 
oral announcement was not reduced to a 
signed written decree prior to the death 
of Mr. Preece, a previously made order 
did not exist and therefore did not afford 
the court the right to employ the nunc 
pro tunc device. 
However, even if the oral announce-
ment were considered a previous order, 
nunc pro tunc was misapplied here. A 
nunc pro tunc order should be the reflec-
tion of a previously made ruling. The 
court had orally announced that the de-
cree was "to become final upon signing." 
By making it effective as of the trial date 
rather than upon signing, the court al-
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tered its previous ruling. It did not 
merely reflect its previous ruling. 
Preece, 682 P.2d at 300. 
Subsequent to the trial in Preece, the 
Utah Legislature enacted a statute commit-
ting broad discretion to trial courts in 
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic 
relations matters: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its 
finding of good cause and giving of such 
notice as may be ordered, enter an order 
nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or an-
nulment of marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984). 
In support of his contention that the 
court erred in entering the decree nunc 
pro tunc to June 20, 1984, defendant ar-
gues this statutory provision applies only 
to marital status and not to the property 
division aspect of a divorce. Further, de-
fendant contends that, even if the statutory 
language is interpreted to deal with issues 
beyond marital status, the statute does not 
expand the limited use of nunc pro tunc at 
common law as delineated in Preece. Fi-
nally, defendant claims that, regardless of 
whether the statute otherwise applies, the 
facts of this case do not constitute "good 
cause" for entry of the court's Order nunc 
pro tunc. 
II. 
[2] Defendant argues Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-4a-l (1984) is limited to matters in-
volving marital status. In construing legis-
lative enactments, we assume that each 
term in the statute was used advisedly. 
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 
446 (Utah 1982). This Court therefore in-
terprets and applies the statute according 
to its literal wording unless it is unreason-
ably confused or inoperable. Id. 
1. For example, Cal. Civil Code § 4515 (West 
1970), prior to its 1983 amendment, stated that 
upon the filing of a final judgment nunc pro 
tunc "the parties to such action shall be deemed 
to have been restored to the status of single 
persons as of the date affixed to such judgment." 
Id. (emphasis added). See In Re Marriage of 
Frapwell, 53 Cai.App.3d 479, 485. 125 Cal.Rptr. 
878, 881 (1975) (where no second marriage was 
involved, entry of a divorce decree nunc pro 
tunc was inappropriate). 
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[3] The nunc pro tunc statute express-
ly states the court may "enter an order 
nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or an-
nulment of marriage." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-4a-l (1984) (emphasis added). By its 
wording, the statute applies to any and all 
matters relating to divorce proceedings. 
Had the legislature intended the statute to 
be limited to status, it could have easily so 
stated.1 
Defendant asserts the legislative history 
of this statute demonstrates an intent that 
the statute apply only in cases of marital 
status, such as where a decree of divorce is 
prepared but not signed and the parties 
subsequently remarry. The Utah Supreme 
Court has frequently stated that in con-
struing legislative enactments, courts must 
give effect to the legislature's underlying 
intent. See, e.g., Millett v. Clark Clinic 
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). 
The legislative history indicates the bill 
was passed "because there have been a 
number of cases of obvious injustice that 
could be corrected by the entry of nunc 
pro tunc decrees by the court." TV. of 3rd 
Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27, 1983, 
comments of Rep. Lorin Pace. Representa-
tive Pace, sponsor of the Bill, gave a varie-
ty of diverse examples wherein entry of an 
order nunc pro tunc might be appropriate 
including: where the parties, believing they 
were divorced, entered into subsequent 
marriages (status); where a death occurred 
after a divorce proceeding had been heard 
but before the order had been filed (status 
incident to property division); and where 
there was a clerical error in filing the di-
vorce papers (status and/or property divi-
sion). Id. The legislative history includes 
examples of both status and property divi-
Similarly, the Washington statutory scheme 
allowing for entry of final divorce decrees nunc 
pro tunc contains limiting language that upon 
entry of such decree, "the parties to such action 
shall be deemed to have been restored to the 
status of single persons as of the date affixed to 
such judgment." Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 26.09.-
290 (1973) (emphasis added). See Pratt v. Pratt, 
99 Wash.2d 905, 665 P.2d 400 (1983) (entry of 
decree nunc pro tunc proper only when neces-
sary to validate a subsequent marriage). 
248 Utah 737 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
sion problems which demonstrate a need 
for the legislation. Furthermore, the legis-
lative history reveals an intent to give the 
courts broad discretion to enter orders 
nunc pro tunc in domestic proceedings 
where an obvious injustice would otherwise 
result 
Our review of the statutory language 
and legislative history of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-4a-l (1984) reveals no intent on the 
part of the legislature to limit the scope of 
the nunc pro tunc statute only to cases 
involving the marital status of the parties. 
III. 
Defendant further contends that the 
statute does not eliminate the common law 
requirement of a previously made final or-
der as discussed in Preece v. Preece, 682 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). This contention is 
contradicted by sound principles of statu-
tory construction and by the legislative his-
tory of the nunc pro tunc act. 
[4] Statutes are not to be construed as 
effecting any change in the common law 
beyond that which is clearly indicated. 
However, where a statute is in derogation 
of the common law, and is also remedial in 
nature, the remedial application should be 
construed so as to give effect to its pur-
pose. Terry v. Lincscott Hotel Corp., 126 
Ariz. 548, 617 P.2d 56, 60 (1980); see Mars-
land v. Pang, 701 P.2d 175, 192-93 (Hawaii 
App.1985); cf. Hansen v. Utah State Re-
tirement BcL, 652 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah 
1982). 
[5] A literal reading of § 30-4a-l indi-
cates a legislative intent to change the 
standard for entry of nunc pro tunc orr 
ders in domestic proceedings from requir-
ing a previously made final order as deline-
ated by common law, to requiring a finding 
of "good cause." As pointed out by Justice 
Stewart in his dissent in Preece: 
The Legislature has recently enacted a 
statute that commits broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc 
orders in domestic relations matters 
All that need be shown is "good cause." 
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
Further, the legislative history reveals 
the statute was remedial in nature. The 
purpose of the statute was described by 
Rep. Lorin Pace as follows: 
And the reason this bill is before us is 
because there have been a number of 
cases of obvious injustice that could be 
corrected by the entry of nunc pro tunc 
decrees by the court 
7V. of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 
27, 1983. 
Moreover, the examples given by Rep. 
Pace during the Bill's third reading indicate 
an intent to overrule the common law ap-
proach to nunc pro tunc orders which was 
causing "obvious injustice." Indeed, Rep. 
Pace made specific reference to the Preece 
-type situation where at common law, due 
to a husband's death occurring after a di-
vorce proceeding has been heard, but before 
the order has been entered, a wife is enti-
tled to a widow's portion of the estate 
rather than the provisions agreed to in the 
divorce proceeding. Clearly the statute 
sought to remedy the injustice caused by 
the common law approach.2 
IV. 
Having found that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-4a-l (1984) allows the granting of 
nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations 
matters upon a finding of "good cause," we 
now face the question of whether the trial 
court's entry of his Order nunc pro tunc 
in this case was based upon "good cause." 
[6] In defining "good cause" for pur-
poses of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984), 
it must be borne in mind that the legisla-
tive history indicates an intention to give 
the courts wide discretion to prevent "obvi-
ous injustices." The meaning of "good 
cause" must be determined on a case by 
case basis, in light of all of the surrounding 
circumstances, as equity and justice re-
2. The analysis and holding in Preece v. Preece, 
682 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) therefore has been 
statutorily overruled. 
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quire. See Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 
402, 407 (Mo. 1963); In Re Estate of Cor-
bett, 203 Neb. 392, 279 N.W.2d 89, 95 
(1979); cf. Wray v. Folsom, 166 F.Supp. 
390, 394 (W.D.Ark.1958); Daly v. Daly, 533 
P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1975) (Crockett, J., 
dissenting in part). 
In the case before us, defendant con-
tends there was no basis for a finding of 
good cause and thus the entry of the order 
nunc pro tunc. The district court express-
ly found: 
The Court finds that with the recent un-
expected change in the tax laws that 
good cause exists to grant Plaintiffs Mo-
tion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order Nunc 
Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984. The court 
further finds that the Defendant was 
given proper notice of such Motion. 
If the court had entered its order nunc 
pro tunc to give effect to the parties' 
expressed intentions prior to the change in 
the tax laws, good cause no doubt would 
exist. Our review of the record, however, 
reveals the contrary. The agreement 
reached between the parties on June 20 
expressly states: "[The property] will be 
transferred to her as an exchange item to 
equalize the marital assets of the parties in 
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this matter." In entering the order prior 
to the effective date of the Reform Act, 
and without the essential and agreed upon 
tax language, the court either misunder-
stood how critical the tax language was to 
the parties' agreement or substituted its 
own judgment for that of the parties, and it 
misused its nunc pro tunc power to ac-
complish that aim. Furthermore, a fair 
reading of the record indicates that in 
reaching its decision, the court improperly 
considered plaintiffs offer to drop the mis-
conduct charges against her counsel in re-
turn for entry of the order nunc pro tunc. 
Such conduct does not constitute "good 
cause" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-4a-l (1984). 
Reversed and remanded for entry of the 
order of property division effective August 
17, 1984. No costs. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., 
concur. 
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Elaine Siddoway RICHARDS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Henry Ralph SIDDOWAY, Mary Siddoway 
and Ben Morrison, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 11800. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 11, 1970. 
Action to determine ownership of land, 
wherein defendant asserted that decree in 
prior partition suit contained clerical error 
in that it awarded his predecessor in title 
only life estate, with remainder to plain-
tiff. On motion of defendant, the Fourth 
District Court, Uintah County, Allen B. 
Sorensen, J., ordered correction of the as-
serted clerical error, and plaintiff-remain-
derman appealed. The Supreme Court, El-
lett, J., held that, where the error, if any, 
in the prior decree resulted from failure of 
the court to follow written agreement of 
the parties, and not from failure of judg-
ment to follow findings of fact, such error 
was not "clerical," and thus such prior de-
cree was not subject to amendment on mo-
tion in the instant case; and that decree in 
the prior case was res judicata as to the 
matters involved in the instant case. 
Reversed with directions. 
Tuckett, J., did not participate. 
I. Judgment <§=>304, 306 
Distinction between "judicial error," 
which may not be corrected on motion aft-
er time limited by rule or statute, and 
"clerical error," which may be so correct-
ed, does not depend on who made it; rath-
er, it depends on whether it was made in 
rendering the judgment or in recording the 
judgment as rendered. Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, rule 60(b). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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2. Judgment €=>306 
Where error, if any, whereby decree 
in partition suit awarded to one of the par-
ties only life estate with remainder over, 
rather than fee, resulted from failure of 
court to follow written agreement signed 
by the parties, and not from failure of 
judgment to follow findings of fact, such 
alleged error was not "clerical error," and 
thus decree was not subject to amendment, 
some ten years thereafter, on motion in 
separate action brought to determine title 
as between putative remainderman and 
successor in title of putative life tenant. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b). 
3. Judgment <§=>297 
Where error in judgment is not mere-
ly clerical, it must be corrected by timely 
motion for new trial, by timely appeal, or 
by independent suit in equity wherein all 
the parties to the original proceeding are 
made parties. 
4. Judgment <&=>7I2 
Final judgment in partition suit 
whereby one of the parties was awarded 
life estate with remainder over was res ju-
dicata in action brought thereafter to de-
termine title as between putative remain-
derman and successor in title of putative 
life tenant. 
William G. Gibbs, of Clyde, Mecham & 
Pratt, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Hugh W. Colton, of Colton & Ham-
mond, Vernal, for respondents. 
ELLETT, Justice. 
This is an action to determine ownership 
of 20 acres of land. The plaintiff, appel-
lant, hereafter referred to as Elaine, claims 
title by reason of a judgment rendered 
March 3, 1959, which awarded her the fee 
after a life estate in her father, now de-
ceased. That decree resulted from a stipu-
lation signed by seven of the eight 
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children x of one William H. Siddoway, de-
ceased, not all of whom were involved in a 
lawsuit for the partition of the land of in-
heritance. That suit was numbered 3652 
and hereafter will be referred to by that 
number. 
The stipulation provided that the four 
male children would take the range land as 
tenants in common, three of them to re-
ceive the fee, the fourth—father of Elaine 
—would take a life estate with remainder 
over to Elaine, who was his only child. 
There was an 80-acre tract of land 
known as the McCarrell place, which ac-
cording to the stipulation was to be de-
creed "as the interests may appear in the 
male heirs." * There was a considerable 
amount of other property involved in the 
stipulation. The decree of the court gave 
to Elaine's father only a life estate in all 
of the realty with remainder over in fee to 
Elaine. 
The decree was filed in the office of the 
county recorder on May 27, 1959, and 
thereafter all the world was put on notice 
that the father had only a life estate in the 
land.3 Subsequently, on September 1, 1959, 
the decree was amended to correct a de-
scription in the 20 acres apportioned to 
Elaine's father. 
On January 8, 1961, Elaine's father and 
her stepmother gave the land in question to 
Ben Morrison for a debt owing to him, 
and on January 19, 1962, her father died. 
This action was commenced September 16, 
1963. A default judgment was granted 
and then set aside, and finally an amended 
answer was filed on December 31, 1968, 
wherein the defendants claimed that the 
judgment in case No. 3652 contained a 
clerical error in that the decree should 
have given the fee to Elaine's father. At 
the same time, a motion in this matter was 
made to correct the so-called clerical error 
in the other case. 
I. No point is made on this appeal of the 
fact that one child did not sign the 
stipulation. 
The trial court herein granted the mo-
tion to amend the judgment in case No. 
3652 under the assumption that he was cor-
recting a clerical error, and by doing so he 
deprived Elaine of the fee to the 20 acres 
of land involved in this case, and the only 
issue before us on this appeal is one of 
law, to wit: Is the order purporting to re-
form the judgment in case 3652 valid ? 
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provides as fol-
lows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) * * * (3) 
• • * (4) * * # (5) * * * 
(6) * * * (7) * * * The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or tak-
en. * * * This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an in-
dependent action to relieve a party from 
a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by mo-
tion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
This rule was based upon Section 104-
14-4, U.C.A.1943, reading: 
The court may, * * * upon such 
terms as may be just, relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a judgment, 
order or other proceeding taken against 
him through his mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect; and when, 
for any reason satisfactory to the court 
or the judge thereof, the party aggrieved 
has failed to apply for a new trial or 
other relief sought during the term at 
which such judgment, order or proceed-
2. I t is the one-fourth share of this land 
which is involved in this present action. 
3. Section 57-3-2, U.C.A.1053. 
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ing complained of was taken, the court, 
or judge thereof in vacation, may grant 
the relief upon application made within a 
reasonable time, not exceeding ninety 
days after the making or occurrence of 
the judgment, order or other proceeding 
sought to be relieved from. * * * 
Prior to 1939 the reasonable time was 
stated to be not exceeding six months. 
Since 1939 under both the statute and the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, one wishing to 
amend a judgment valid upon its face must 
move to do so within three months except 
for correction of clerical errors. The gen-
eral rule is found in 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 
238: 
After expiration of the term at which 
it was rendered, or of the statutory peri-
od of limitation, in cases governed by 
statute, a judgment is no longer open to 
any amendment, revision, modification, 
or correction which involves the exercise 
of the judgment or discretion of the 
court on the merits or on matters of sub-
stance. The only amendment then per-
missible is one which is intended to make 
the judgment speak the truth by showing 
what the judicial action really was, and 
not one which corrects judicial errors or 
remedies the effects of judicial nonac-
tion; the court has no power at such 
time to revise and amend a judgment by 
correcting judicial errors, and making it 
express something which the court did 
not pronounce, and did not intend to pro-
nounce, in the first instance.
 # Judicial 
errors in judgments are to be corrected 
by appeal or writ of error, or by certio-
rari, or by awarding a new trial, or by 
any means specially provided by statute, 
and not by amendment, unless the statute 
permits such amendment. 
[1] The distinction between a judicial 
error and a clerical error does not depend 
upon who made it. Rather, it depends on 
whether it was made in rendering the 
judgment or in recording the judgment as 
rendered. 46 Amjur.2d Judgments § 202. 
[2,3] In case No. 3652 the court may 
have erred in giving Elaine the remainder 
471 P.2d—10 
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of the land in question, but there was no 
clerical error involved. It resulted from 
the failure of the judge to follow the writ-
ten agreement signed by seven of the eight 
heirs of William H. Siddoway but not by 
Elaine, although she was a party to the 
partition suit wherein the judgment was 
rendered. Only Elaine and her father 
knew whether the decree entered by the 
court was according to their wishes and in-
tentions. Neither of them ever appealed, 
and the judgment became final some nine 
years before an answer was filed in the in-
stant matter. The record does not show 
that the judgment did not follow the find-
ings of fact. Such an error must be cor-
rected by a timely motion for a new trial, 
by timely appealing the matter, or by an 
independent action wherein all of the par-
ties to the original proceeding are made 
parties to a new suit in equity. 
The question posed on this appeal has 
been answered several times by this court. 
In the early case of Elliott v. Bastian, 11 
Utah 452, 40 P. 713 (1895), a judgment of 
no cause of action was taken against a de-
ceased plaintiff. Since the death of the 
party did not appear of record, this court 
held that the judgment was not void. Sub-
stituted plaintiffs moved to set aside and 
vacate the judgment after the six months' 
period had run. The trial court denied the 
motion, and in affirming the ruling this 
court said: 
* * * And it is clear that the rea-
sonable time mentioned is the six-months 
limit prescribed by the statute. "The 
time within which such an order could 
be vacated must be held to be limited by 
section 473. * * * The court had no 
jurisdiction after the expiration of six 
months to vacate the order made on a 
mere motion for that purpose, the order 
not being void on its face." Moore v. 
Superior Court, 86 Cal. [495] 496, 25 P . 
22. We are of the opinion that the low-
er court has no authority to vacate the 
judgment rendered in this case upon the 
application made. * * * 
Another case in point is Benson v. An-
derson, 14 Utah 334, 47 P. 142 (1896). 
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Here a judgment was entered December 
15, 1894. More than six months later 
(July 8, 1895) the defendants moved to 
amend the judgment by striking therefrom 
the provision that costs be rendered against 
them. The court on December 9, 1895, 
granted the motion. On January 21, 1896, 
the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the 
order of December 9, 1895. This motion 
was granted, and the order purporting to 
amend the judgment was set aside. The 
defendants appealed from the last order. 
In affirming the ruling striking the amend-
ment, this court said: 
The term of the court at which the fi-
nal decree adjudging the costs against 
the defendants was made had expired 
months before the motion to strike out 
was made. In fact, another term inter-
vened. It was not a void decree,—mere 
ly a decree in form,—nor was it a decree 
pro confesso, or by default. Therefore 
the defendant should have entered his 
motion during the term at which the de-» 
cree was made, or, if he desired a re-
hearing or new trial, he should have giv-
en notice and filed his motion for a new 
trial within such time as the statute al-
lowed. That time having passed, the de-
cree could be opened only by bill of re-
view, or by an original complaint for 
fraud. "But neither a final judgment 
nor a final decree, pronounced upon a 
hearing on the merits, can be set aside 
after the term, upon motion, for any er-
ror into which the court may have fall-
en. The law does not permit any judi-
cial tribunal to exercise any revisory 
power over its own adjudications after 
they have, in contemplation of the law, 
passed out of the breast of the judge." 
1 Freemjudgm. § 101. * * * 
In the case of Lees v. Freeman, 19 Utah 
481, 57 P. 411 (1899), the clerk had made a 
minute entry on July 12, 1897, stating that 
in the case of John Lees, plaintiff, v. J. J. 
Freeman, defendant, the court renders its 
judgment and finds for the plaintiff and 
against the defendant in teh sum of $456.-
71 and costs of suit or a return of the 
sheep in question and that findings and de-
cree in accordance therewith be signed and 
filed. Thereafter, on August 5, 1897, find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law were 
filed and entered awarding judgment 
against the defendants J. J. Freeman and I. 
E. Freeman for the sum of $485.59, inter-
ests and costs. On February 18, 1898, I. 
E. Freeman filed his verified petition in 
the same case to modify and correct the 
judgment on the ground that the court had 
found the judgment against J. J. Freeman 
only. On September 12, 1898, the court 
made the following order: 
That the actual findings of this court 
after the trial, and as announced from 
the bench, were in favor of the defend-
ant, I. E. Freeman, no cause of action. 
That the court inadvertently, and with-
out the knowledge or consent of the de-
fendant petitioner, and against the well-
known and avowed findings of the court, 
signed findings and decree whereby 
judgment was erroneously and unjustly 
rendered against I. E. Freemen, 
* * *# 
As a conclusion of law the court con-
cluded that the decree signed on the 12th 
of July, 1897, and filed August 5, 1897, 
should be modified so that the same would 
show no cause of action against I. E. Free-
man and that the judgment against J. J. 
Freeman should stand. The plaintiff ap-
pealed from this order. In reversing the 
trial court, this court at pages 485 and 486 
of the Utah Reports, at page 411 of 57 P. 
said: 
The record presents a strong argument 
in favor of the equitable action of the 
court; but our statute does not give ju« 
risdiction, under the circumstances 
shown. In a case such as presented 
here, a bill in equity is the proper reme-
dy by which all the parties may be 
brought before the court, and where is-
sues may be regularly joined and tried 
on all the facts connected with the trans-
action. * * * 
The judgment and findings as origi-
nally entered should stand unless correct-
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ed by proper proceedings commenced for 
that purpose. 
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Frick in J. P. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. City 
Court of Salt Lake City, 54 Utah 541, 544, 
182 P. 205 (1919), states the law: 
* * * Under the statute in question 
here, the application to obtain relief 
from a default judgment must be made 
in the original action and upon the 
grounds stated in the statute. The right 
to thus proceed must of necessity be 
made in accordance with the statutory 
provisions as pointed out by Mr. Justice 
Gideon. That, however, does not pre-
clude the respondent from instituting an 
independent action in equity to enjoin 
the enforcement of the judgment or to 
obtain relief if the facts and circum-
stances justify such an action as pointed 
out in the case of McMillan v. Forsythe, 
47 Utah, 571,154 Pac. 959. 
In Frost et al. v. District Court et al., % 
Utah 106, 83 P2d 737 (1938), the trail 
court undertook to modify a judgment 
some four years after it was entered. It 
was contended that the amendment was 
merely a clerical error. In the original de-
cree Frost was given rights to a water 
flow with a priority of 1891 and subject to 
a priority date of 1876 in favor of Allen S. 
Tanner. The amendment eliminated the 
reference to the priority dates. The court 
held the change to be one of substance and 
said: 
Where there has been no retention of 
jurisdiction by the trial court, unaided by 
statute, it has no power after the expira-
tion of the term and certainly after the 
time for appealing has expried, to 
change or modify its judgment in a sub-
stantial or material respect. This is well 
settled law. 
The point was again raised in the matter 
of In re Goddard's Estate, 73 Utah 298, 
273 P. 961 (1929). There a trial was had 
before a judge pro tempore and judgment 
entered October 29, 1926. The term of 
court terminated November 22, 1926. On 
October 15, 1927, a petition was filed alleg-
SIDDOWAY Utah 147 
P.2d 143 
ing that the proceedings before the judge 
pro tempore were invalid for reasons 
therein stated. The trial judge on Febru-
ary 28, 1928, made and entered an order 
vacating and setting aside all proceedings 
had before the judge pro tempore, and an 
appeal was taken from that order. In an-
nulling the order this court had this to 
say: 
By numerous decisions of this court it 
is settled that a judgment, not void on 
its face, cannot in the same proceeding 
by motion, be opened or vacated by the 
court which rendered it, except within 
six months after the adjournment of the 
term at which the judgment was ren-
dered. [Citations omitted.] * * *. 
* * * * * * 
The rule applicable is wholesome and 
necessary. There must be an end to the 
time when judgment can be questioned. 
In this case the protestant had a reme-
dy by motion for new trial and also by 
appeal, but she permitted the time limit-
ed by law therefor to lapse without seek-
ing either. Nearly a year after the ad-
journment of the term at which the pro-
ceedings were had, she, by a motion, at-
tempted to avoid the judgment upon ex-
trinsic grounds. It is a case plainly 
within the rule which denies jurisdiction 
of a court to open or vacate its judg-
ments under such circumstances. 
The respondent in the instant case did 
not file a suit in equity whereby all parties 
to case No. 3652 could be brought before 
the court. He did not even attempt to 
amend the judgment by filing a motion in 
that case. Instead, like the cowbird, which 
lays its eggs in the nests of other birds to 
be hatched and reared without labor unto 
itself, he planted his motion to amend the 
judgment of case 3652 in this matter and 
prevailed upon the judge to sign an order 
herein purporting to amend it some ten 
years after it was entered. 
[4] This order is a nullity, and the 
judgment of 1959 is still in force and ef-
fect, and as such it is res judicata as to the 
matters involved on this appeal. The 
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judgment of the trial court is reversed 
with directions to enter judgment in favor 
of the appellant awarding her the title to 
the land in question, together with her 
costs. 
CROCKETT, C. J., CALLISTER and 
HENRIOD, JJ., and ALDON J. ANDER-
SON, District Judge, concur. 
TUCKETT, J., having disqualified him-
self, does not participate herein. 
V 5 \ 
24 Utah 2d 321 
BARBIZON OF UTAH, INC., Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL OIL COMPANY et al., Defend-
ants and Respondents. 
No. 11364. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 9, 1970. 
Consolidated quiet title actions involv-
ing boundary dispute between fee holders 
of adjoining parcels of land. The Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Joseph E. 
Nelson, J., rendered judgment for defend-
ants and denied plaintiff's motion to amend 
judgment or grant new trial, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, 
J., held that where there was no affirma-
tive evidence to establish location of center 
of section as it was created by United 
States Government survey, and location of 
common boundary of parties could only be 
determined by its tie to center of section, 
judgment based on private survey tied to 
railroad's right-of-way was erroneous. 
Reversed and remanded for disposition 
in accordance with opinion. 
Crockett, C. J., concurred specially and 
filed opinion. 
Boundaries <S=>37(I) 
Where there was no affirmative evi-
dence to establish location of center of sec-
tion as it was created by United States 
Government survey, and location of com-
mon boundary of parties could only be de-
termined by its tie to center of section, 
judgment based on private survey tied to 
railroad's right-of-way was erroneous. 
Cullen Y. Christensen, Provo, Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker, Albert R. Bowen, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
Leon M. Frazier, Provo, for respondents. 
CALLISTER, Justice. 
This action involves a boundary dispute 
between the fee holders of adjoining par-
cels of land situated in Provo, Utah. Each 
party initiated a quiet title action against 
the other, and the two cases were consoli-
dated for trial. The trial court rendered 
judgment for the defendant, General Oil 
Company, and subsequently denied plain-
tiff's motion to amend the judgment or to 
grant a new trial. Plaintiff, Barbizon of 
Utah, Inc., has appealed on the ground that 
there is insufficient evidence to support 
the judgment. 
'The abstracts of title of both parties are 
in evidence. The'root title of both parcels 
was a patent from the United States of 
America to James Smith, wherein he was 
granted the southeast quarter of Section 
36 in Township 6 South of Range 2 East 
"according to the official plat of the sur-
vey of said lands, returned to the General 
Land Office by the Surveyor General." 
Subsequently, Smith conveyed a parcel 
of land to one Baum, General Oil's prede-
cessor in interest, and a parcel to one 
Bean, Barbizon's predecessor in interest. 
These two parcels were contiguous, shar-
ing a common east-west boundary; the de-
scriptions did not overlap. Both convey-
ances had as a starting point in their de-
scriptions the northwest corner of the 
southeast quarter of Section 36, the center 
of the section. After Baum's death, the 
MEAGHER v. EQU 
Cite as 29 
5 Utah 2d 10G 
N. J. MEAGHER, Jr., Mary Alice Arentz, 
Katherine C. Ivers, Margaret Frances 
Price, N. J. Meagher and Katherine T. 
Meagher, his wife, Plaintiffs, Respondents 
and Appellants on Separate Appeal, 
v. 
EQUITY OIL COMPANY, a corporation, 
Weber Oil Company, a corporation, Joe T. 
Juhan, Paul Stock, and All Unknown Per-
sons who claim any interest in the subject 
matter of this action, Defendants, Appel-
lants and Respondents on Separate Appeal. 
No. 8483. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 5, 1956. 
Action to quiet title to land covered 
by an oil and gas lease. The Fourth Judi-
cial District Court, Uintah County, R. L. 
Tuckett, J., entered order vacating prior 
order on ground that prior order had been 
erroneously made and was in conflict with 
judgment previously entered, and all par-
ties appealed. The Supreme Court, Crock-
ett, J., held that, where trial judge thought 
he was signing an order requiring oil com-
pany to release one-half of proceeds of oil 
production to named persons, who had been 
determined to be entitled to such half, but 
such persons had been currently receiving 
such funds so that effect of order was to 
release to them one-half of the other half, 
to which they were not entitled, judge's ac-
tion did not represent an error in judgment 
but constituted a mistake of a perfunctory 
or clerical nature and was type of error 
which judge could properly correct upon 
his own motion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
I. Judgment <§=>306, 363 
Motions <S=358, 59(1) 
Court may vacate, set aside, or modify 
its orders or judgments which have been 
entered by mistake or inadvertence and 
which do not accurately reflect result of its 
judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
7(b), 60(a). 
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2. Judgment €=306, 316 
Where, in action to quiet title to land 
covered by an oil and gas lease, trial judge 
thought he was signing an order requiring 
oil company to release one-half of proceeds 
of oil production to named persons, who had 
been determined to be entitled to such half, 
but such persons had been currently re-
ceiving such funds so that effect of order 
was to release to them one-half of the other 
half, to which they were not entitled, trial 
judge's action did not represent an error 
in judgment but constituted a mistake of a 
perfunctory or clerical nature and was 
type of error which judge could properly 
correct upon his own motion. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 7(b), 60(a). 
3. Courts <S=>116(1) 
Court's authority to cause its pro-
ceedings and its judgments and orders to be 
correctly set forth in its records is neces-
sarily inherent in its powers for the pur-
pose of administering justice. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 7(b), 60(a). 
4. Lis Pendens €=24(1) 
One who buys property with knowl-
edge that it is in litigation is bound by 
judgment rendered in such litigation.1 
5. Stipulations €=14(1) 
Where plaintiffs' predecessor stipu-
lated that fund made up of accumulated 
royalties due under oil and gas lease should 
be held by oil company as long as title ques-
tions to the lease persisted and until the 
court otherwise ordered, it would be as-
sumed that this was until final determina-
tion, and, therefore, court would not de-
termine whether a wrongful and designed 
withholding of the royalties might provide 
basis for cause of action for enhancement 
of income taxes to plaintiffs upon payment 
to them of the total fund over what they 
would have paid in income taxes had they 
received the royalty income as it accrued. 
6. Judgment <S=>2I6, 217 
In action to quiet title to land covered 
by an oil and gas lease, judgment, which 
was referred to as an interlocutory judg-
I. Whitraker v. Greenwood, 17 Utah 33, 53 P. 730. 
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nient and decree, would be considered as 
interlocutory to extent that it was neces-
sary that there be an accounting as to pro-
ceeds due plaintiff in accordance with her 
interest and payment thereof but would be 
considered as final to extent that it deter-
mined rights of parties in the lease. 
Ray Rawlins, Jones & Henderson, Gus-
tin, Richards & Mattssnn, Burton \V. Mus-
scr, Salt Lake City, Oliver W. Stcadman, 
Cody, Wyo., Richard Downing, Denver, 
Colo., for appellants. 
Herbert Van Dam, Jr., Salt Lake City, 
Gilbert C. Wheat, San Francisco, Cal., for 
respondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
This litigation is before this court for its 
fourth engpgement, having been here on 
three prior occasions.1 These repeat per-
formances arc not due to the merit of the 
controversy nor to the popularity of the 
subject matter with this court. They seem 
rather to stem, to a considerable extent, 
from an unwillingness of defendants to 
recognize and perform their obligations to 
plaintiffs as adjudicated in prior proceed-
ings. 
The controversy centers around rights in 
a lease, referred to as the "Sheridan lease" 
in certain oil lands in Uintah County. The 
origin and history of this lease are set out 
in our prior decisions referred to above, 
and, except to the extent incorporated 
herein, do not warrant repetition here. 
The original bases of the rights of the par-
ties in the Sheridan lease are immaterial 
here except to say that the defendant, Paul 
Stock, and one Ray Phebus were assignees 
of rights therein; and that in 1944, for 
reasons likewise not material here, Stock 
executed an instrument called a "Release" 
of his interest (hereinafter called the 
"Stock half") in the lease to the fee holder, 
I. Mcrpher v. Uintah Gas Co., No. 0972 
(October 27, 1047) 112 Utah 140, 185 
P.2d 747; Phobtis v. Dnnford. No. 7187 
(November 8, 1048) 114 Utah 202. 108 
P.2d 07.1; Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 
N. J. Meagher, Sr., which in this later 
phase of the litigation has been the subject 
of dispute between the parties. The other 
one-half interest (referred to as the "Phe-
bus half") is now owned by the defendants, 
Stock, Joe T. Julian and Weber Oil Com-
pany, who derive their interest through 
Phebus, and which interest is not in dispute 
here. 
The original action was instituted by N. 
J. Meagher, Sr. in 1944. While the litiga-
tion has been pending, the Equity Oil Com-
pany, in 1948, with full knowledge of the 
parties, and under an agreement with 
Stock, Julian and Weber Oil Company, en-
tered upon the property, drilled and dis-
covered oil; and since that date has con-
tinued to produce and sell the oil from the 
property. The parties, including the plain-
tiff, N. J. Meagher, Sr., and the defendants, 
Stock, Juhan and Equity Oil Company, 
stipulated in court that the ownership of 
these parties is SU/2% of the oil rights un-
der the lease, there being 181/2% interest 
therein outstanding as royalties not in-
volved in the litigation. As to the one-
half interest (the Stock half) claimed by 
Meagher, and his children, who are his as-
signees and present plaintiffs, it was agreed 
that Equity Oil, "has impounded, set aside 
and holds in a special account 40.75% of 
the gross crude oil runs from said property 
after deducting operating expenses and 
will continue to so impound such per cent 
of gross crude oil runs as long as title ques-
tions persist and until the court otherwise 
orders" and the court made and entered its 
minute entry in accordance with such stip; 
ulation. 
The lower court decided the issue as to 
the effect of the Stock "release," relating 
to the Stock half interest, in favor of Mea-
gher, which was affirmed by this court m 
Case No. 7723 February 11, 1953.2 Upon 
remand to the District Court Stock and 
Juhan, and Weber Oil Company, their sue-
No. 7723 (February 11, 1033) Utah, 255 
P.2<1 980. Rchcariug donicd January l9, 
1954. 
2. Foot note 1, supra. 
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cessor, and Equity Oil Company failed and 
refused to account to the plaintiffs. This 
was based in part upon the ground that the 
latter two companies were not parties to 
the prior proceedings. Plaintiffs then, in 
May, 1954, commenced this acHon joining 
said companies as defendants with the in-
dividuals named, seeking to have the ques-
tion of their ownership determined as 
against all of the defendants; for an ac-
counting of the operation and proceeds 
from oil production on the leased property 
and payment of proceeds due thern; and 
added a fourth count for damages for in-
creased income taxes plaintiffs allege they 
will have to pay because the income was 
not paid to them as it accrued. Pursuant 
to motion, the trial court dismissed this 
fourth count in December, 1954. 
The parties made motions for summary 
judgment and the trial court heard argu-
ments in support thereof in May, • 1955. 
Thereafter on October 14, 1955, the court 
made and caused to be placed in the file 
his written "Rulings on Motions" by which 
he determined the following: 
1. That the defendants Juhan and Stock 
are bound by the decision handed down by 
this court in 1953 and are precluded from 
litigating issues that were or could have 
been raised there; 
2. That the Weber Oil Co., being in 
privity with Stock and Juhan, is also bound 
by the former judgment; 
3. That the Equity Oil Company ap-
pears only as a stakeholder, and that it has 
maintained a special fund of at least 40.-
75% of the "gross crude oil runs [re-
turns]" after expenses of operations; 
4. That the plaintiffs are entitled to a 
summary judgment against Equity Oil 
Company for an accounting of the opera-
tions and profits of the oil produced by that 
company on the lands in question, and for 
a judgment against Equity for an amount 
equal to one half the proceeds after oper-
ating expenses are deducted. 
After considering proposed findings and 
judgments submitted by the respective par-
ties, and objections thereto, on December 
13, 1955, the court entered its Interlocutory 
Judgment and Decree in accordance with 
the above recited "rulings on motions"; 
adjudging that plaintiffs are entitled to an 
undivided one-half interest in the lease as 
against Weber Oil Company; and also as 
against Stock and Juhan, in accordance with 
the former judgment; that Equity Oil 
Company as stakeholder be required to 
render an accounting to the plaintiffs of 
the oil production and sale, and to pay to 
plaintiffs 40.75% of the gross proceeds, 
less one-half of the operating expense; 
and authorized said payment to be made 
from the impounded funds held by Equity. 
A procedural difficulty developed which 
has given rise to much perplexity. On the 
same day as the Interlocutory Judgment 
was signed and entered, December 13, 1955, 
Judge Tuckett, at his chambers in Vernal, 
Utah, signed the order which has been the 
cause of the mischief. It was presented to 
him by attorney Burton W. Musser, with-
out having served it upon opposing counsel 
or indicating to them that such an order 
was being presented to the court. It di-
rected that Equity Oil Company pay to 
Stock and Juhan one-half of the funds im-
pounded and held by Equity. It will be 
noted that there was no stipulation that 
proceeds due the Phcbus half of the lease 
should be impounded; that Stock, Juhan 
and Weber Oil Company had been current-
ly receiving that share (40.75%) of the 
proceeds, and that payment to them of an 
additional one-half of the other half of the 
funds which had been impounded, would 
give them a total of three-fourths of the 
proceeds. This was not in accordance with 
the prior decision of this court, nor with 
the subsequent judgment of the trial court 
which had just been entered. 
Upon the same day as he signed the or-
der, the trial judge advised plaintiffs' coun-
sel, Mr. Herbert Van Dam, Jr., by tele-
phone of the fact that Mr. Musser had 
presented such an order. Mr. Van Dam 
asked the judge if it would affect the rights 
of the plaintiffs, to which the judge an-
swered that it was his understanding that 
it would not, but would merely permit the 
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defendants to withdraw the one-half of 
the proceeds to which they were entitled, 
and that it was their privilege to divide 
it among themselves as they saw fit. With-
in minutes thereafter, Mr. Van Dam tele-
phoned back to Judge Tuckctt and asked to 
be advised as to the exact contents of the 
order. Upon learning thereof, he explain-
ed to the judge that the order did seem to 
be in conflict with the judgment and decree 
he had entered. Whereupon the judge ad-
vised that he did not so intend; that he 
would withhold the order and take it back 
to Provo with him, and would hear the 
parties as to the propriety of the order. 
He asked Mr. Van Dam to notify defend-
ants' counsel of such fact. It appears that 
some unsuccessful efforts were made to 
contact Mr. Musser by telephone. Upon 
return to his principal office in Provo, 
Judge Tuckctt, on December 15, 1955, on 
his own initiative, entered an order vacat-
ing the order of the 1.3th, reciting that he 
did so on the ground that the order of the 
13th was erroneously made and was in con-
flict with the judgment he had previously 
entered. Thereafter, plaintiffs noticed a 
motion for an order clarifying the record 
with respect to the inadvertent order of 
December 13. Before the hearing thereon, 
Mr. Musser filed an application to dis-
qualify the district judge, to which maneu-
ver one may attach his own significance. 
The defendants took the position in the 
court below that the order signed on the 
13th was the valid and subsisting judg-
ment ; that the court was without authority 
to enter the corrective order of the 15th, 
and that the same is a nullity. They main-
tained that position when intermediate ap-
peal was sought before this court, and so 
maintain that position in the present pro-
ceeding. Inasmuch as all parties have ap-
pealed and have variously stated the divers 
issues they each contend are raised, we do 
not delineate them, but proceed to consider 
the basic issues in controversy between the 
parties. 
[1-3] The first question relates to the 
conflicting orders of December 13 and De-
cember 15, 1955, and which of them is 
valid. It is well established that the court 
may vacate, set aside, or modify its orders 
or judgments entered by mistake or inad-
vertence which do not accurately reflect 
the result of its judgment.3 It is plainly 
apparent that the trial court thought he 
was signing an order that Equity Oil re-
lease the one half of the proceeds of oil 
production to Stock and Juhan which it 
had been adjudicated previously that they 
were entitled to (the Phebus half), and that 
the judge did not know that they had been 
currently receiving such funds, nor that 
the effect of the order he signed would 
have been to release to them one half of 
the other half (the Stock half) of the funds 
to which it had been adjudicated that they 
were not entitled. This act did not reflect 
his judgment, and, therefore, does not 
represent an error in judgment on his part. 
It was a mistake of a perfunctory or cleri-
cal nature apparently resulting from an er-
roneous assumption that the order as pre-
pared by counsel correctly reflected the 
judgment of this and the lower court It 
is the type of error the court could and 
properly did, correct upon its own motion. 
The authority of the court to cause its pro-
ceedings and its judgments and orders to 
be correctly set forth in its records is nec-
essarily inherent in its powers for the pur-
pose of administering justice.4 
Related to the matter just discussed is 
the contention here made that the adjudi-
cation that plaintiffs are entitled to one-
half interest in the proceeds of the lease 
relates to the "Stock half." This is based 
3. In re Costa's Estate, Cal.App., 224 P. 
2d 851; State ex rel. Vaughn v. District 
Court, 111 Mont. 552, 111 P.2d 810; 
Boylan v. Marine, 104 Cal.App.2d 321, 
231 P.2d 92. 
4. Rule 7(b): " * * * Any order made 
without notice to the adverse party may 
be vneated or modified without notice 
by the judge who made it, * * *"; 
see also National Farmers Union Prop-
erty and Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 
2d 7, 286 P.2d 249; see also 60(a) U.R. 
C.P.; and see Wilson v. Los Angeles 
County Employees Ass'u, 127 Cal.App.2d 
285, 273 P.2d 824. 
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the "Phebus h a l f belongs to the defend-
ants, and that the "Phebus half" has not 
been in litigation in the present case. The 
clarity with which the contrary is shown 
by the record in this case renders it diffi-
cult to attach any serious credibility to 
such an argument. The findings of Judge 
Dun ford in the prior case, entered June 4, 
1951, clearly and definitely set out the in-
terests in the oil rights in said lease: Ju-
lian, %e; Stock, Me; Weber Oil Com-
pany, J4; aggregating one half; and the 
other one-half interest to Meagher, which 
was affirmed by this court in Case No. 
7723 ;5 and the Interlocutory Judgment and 
Decree of December 13, 1955, properly ac-
cords therewith. 
[4] Weber Oil Company is a subsidiary 
of Equity Oil Company; the defendants, 
Stock and Juhan, were among its original 
incorporators; Weber took its interest in 
this lease with full knowledge of the facts 
concerning the ownership of this property 
and of the pending litigation; it has been 
in privity with such defendants in connec-
tion with the activities of this lease and 
the carrying on of this litigation;6 it was 
joined and has been before the court as a 
defendant in this action and is bound by 
the judgment as are the individual defend-
ants. 
Equity Oil Company asserts no claim of 
ownership in the property. It is respons-
ible to the plaintiffs for the proceeds from 
production of oil from the property as their 
interests appear, that is, 40.75% of the pro-
ceeds less one-half of the operating ex-
penses. Equity's activities in connection 
with this property have been as agent of 
Stock, Juhan and Weber Oil Company, and 
they are responsible for its conduct in con-
nection with such activities. 
[5] The final point meriting attention 
is plaintiff's charge that the trial court er-
5. See footnote 1, supra. 
6. That one buying property with knowl-
edge that it is in litigation, is bound by 
their fourth count, 
which claims damages for income taxes 
they allege will be enhanced over what they 
would have paid had they received the in-
come as it accrued. This is a novel theory 
and one with which we have never hereto-
fore been confronted. Plaintiffs cite no 
authority supporting it. We deem it un-
necessary to here decide whether under 
some circumstances a wrongful and de-
signed withholding of funds might provide 
a basis for such a cause of action. In the 
instant case, the answer to plaintiffs' con-
tention is found in the fact that plaintiffs 
(predecessor) stipulated that the fund 
should be held by Equity "as long as title 
questions persist and until the court other-
wise orders." It is to be assumed that this 
was until final determination. 
[6] It is further to be observed that 
although this court finds no merit in the 
contention that the inadvertent order of 
December 13, 1955, was valid there were 
in fact two orders signed by the trial 
judge about which there was dispute be-
tween the parties, and that Equity, through 
its counsel, has stated and reiterated its 
position to be that of willingness to pay 
over this money as soon as it is determined 
who is entitled to it. It is our intention 
that remittitur in this case will fulfill this 
condition. We regard the judgment, which 
i9 referred to as Interlocutory Judgment 
and Decree, signed by Judge Tuckett on 
December 13, 1955, as interlocutory only 
in that it is necessary that there be an 
accounting as to the proceeds due plaintiffs 
in accordance with their interests and pay-
ment of the same. But such judgment is 
final insofar as it determines the rights of 
the parties hereto in the Sheridan lease. 
Judgment affirmed. Costs to plaintiffs. 
McDONOUGII, C. J., and HENRIOD, 
WADE and WORTHEN, JJ., concur. 
judgment rendered in such litigation, see: 
Whittaker v. Greenwood, 17 Utah 33, 53 
P. 736. 
